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Using Observed Choices to Infer Agent's Information: Reconsidering the
Importance of Borrowing Constraints, Uncertainty and Preferences in
College Attendance ∗
Salvador Navarro
Abstract
I use economic theory and estimates of a semiparametrically identiﬁed structural model to analyze the role played
by credit constraints, uncertainty and preferences in explaining college attendance. A methodology for inferring
information available to the agent from individual choices is proposed and implemented. The test distinguishes
which of the unobserved (to the analyst) components of future outcomes are known to the agent and which are
unknown to both at a given stage of the life cycle. I use microdata on earnings, schooling and consumption to
infer the agent's information set and estimate a model of college choice and consumption under uncertainty with
equilibrium borrowing constraints. I estimate that 80% and 44% of the variances of college and high school earnings
respectively are predictable by the agent. Moving to a no tuition economy increases college attendance from 48%
to 50%. When people are allowed to smooth consumption, college increases to nearly 58%. General equilibrium
eﬀects not withstanding, credit constraints have a larger eﬀect than previously suggested.
1 Introduction
Schooling, particularly college, is considered one of the main sources of human capital for the individual.
Consequently, understanding why some individuals get a college education and some do not is, and has
been for a while, an active area of research. While one may think that by now we would have a relatively
good understanding of the determinants of college choice, we still do not have a clear picture. In part
this is a consequence of the literature focusing mostly on whether a particular aspect of schooling can be
explained by a particular cause. That is, diﬀerent branches of the literature focus on estimating returns
to schooling (e.g. Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), Heckman and Vytlacil (1998), Card (2001)); ability
and returns to education (e.g. Cawley, Heckman, Lochner, and Vytlacil (2000), Taber (2001), Belzil and
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Hansen (2002)); the importance of parental income and, more generally, of borrowing constraints (e.g.
Kane (1996), Carneiro and Heckman (2002), Cameron and Taber (2004), Brown, Scholz, and Seshadri
(2007)); the impact of ability (e.g. Card (1995), Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998), Cawley, Heckman, and
Vytlacil (2001)), etc. The few papers that model these determinants jointly (e.g. Cameron and Heckman
(1998), Keane and Wolpin (2001), Cameron and Heckman (2001)) still focus mainly on the role played
by a particular determinant.
In most cases, the literature ignores the role played by the uncertainty facing the agent and uses
ex-post measures (e.g. earnings at age 40) to analyze the agent's schooling decision. When they ac-
count for uncertainty, they assume that the unobserved (to the analyst) variability and the uncertainty
facing the agent essentially coincide.1One of the main contributions of this paper is to adapt the insight
of Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) to develop and
implement a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable
by the agent and information unknown to both (fundamental uncertainty) at each period. The key to
measuring uncertainty is to notice that individual choices reﬂect all the information known to the agent
at a given time.2 Responses of current decisions to future outcome innovations can be used to infer how
much information the agent has. The semiparametric nature of the proposed test allows it to be used
independently of the particular speciﬁcation of the model as long as one considers families of models with
the same determinants of choice.
In this paper, I use economic theory and estimates of a semiparametrically identiﬁed structural model
to analyze the role played by uncertainty and its interaction with credit constraints and preferences in
explaining college graduation. A structural model of schooling choice and consumption allocation under
uncertainty in which borrowing constraints arise in equilibrium is estimated. Once a general model of
schooling choice is estimated, a comparison of the importance of the (nonexclusive) determinants of college
graduation can be carried out. The results I obtain do not single out any one particular determinant as
the main reason why some people go to college and some don't. That this is the case, i.e. that all aspects
of the problem play an important role, should not be surprising given the nature of the decision.
The key empirical results in the paper are:
1. At the time schooling decisions are made, earnings are predictable. In particular, the estimates of
the model imply that 81% of the unexplained variance in college earnings is predictable by the agent
at age 18. This fraction is 44% for high school earnings so college earnings are more predictable.
In fact, while the total unobserved variance of college earnings is higher than that of high school
(i.e the unobserved variance from the analyst's perspective), college earnings are less uncertain than
high school earnings from the point of view of the agent. This is similar to the results obtained by
Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005), Guvenen (2007).
1 For example, both Keane and Wolpin (2001), Cameron and Heckman (2001) estimate their dynamic models of schooling
assuming what is known by the agent and what is known by the econometrician at each point in time. While they allow for
unobserved heterogeneity, it is essentially treated as an initial condition. Once the econometrician conditions on the initial
heterogeneity, the evolution of the information set of the agent is given. However, there is no prior reason why one should
assume that the evolution of what is unknown to the analyst and what is unknown to the agent coincide.
2 A similar idea motivates the work on the permanent income hypothesis of Flavin (1981) and Pistaferri (2001).
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2. Once credit constraints are properly deﬁned and relaxed, they play a much more important role than
previously estimated in the literature. When people are allowed to smooth consumption perfectly
(i.e., when credit constraints and uncertainty are completely eliminated) college attendance only
5.5% of college graduates regret their choice while 21.7% of high school graduates would rather
graduate college. That is, I estimate that college attendance would increase from 49% to nearly
58%. This result is not inconsistent with the evidence presented in Cameron and Heckman (2001),
Keane and Wolpin (2001), Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Cameron and Taber (2004) where
credit constraints are found to be relatively unimportant. The analysis in these papers focuses on
the inability of individuals to obtain funds to pay for tuition as the credit constraint. When I
perform similar tuition reduction simulations I obtain results that are in line with the ones obtained
in these papers. The large eﬀect of credit constraints is in part due to the partial equilibrium nature
of the exercise. However, it is still illustrative of the importance of credit constraints when one
considers the full extent of the constraint and not only the lack of liquidity that maybe associated
with tuition.
3. Individuals are relatively impatient. The estimated annual discount rate is 7% while the assumed
riskless rate is 3%. This helps explain why, even if college earnings are higher than high school
earnings late in life, individuals may choose not to pay the cost of lower earnings in the early part
of their life and choose a high school education.
4. Agents may also have preferences over schooling beyond the consumption value of earnings which
I capture via an additive psychic cost function. Ability is the main determinant of costs and, as
such, plays a key role in determining schooling decisions. High ability individuals face very low
costs while low ability individuals face large costs of attending college. This gives rise to schooling
sorting by ability even though monetary gains do not diﬀer considerably for high school and college
graduates conditional on ability.
5. Schooling decisions are made by agents before all the relevant information about future outcomes
has been revealed. Individual choices are made in an environment of uncertainty and agents base
their decisions on their expectations and not on the realized outcomes observed by the econome-
trician. Expectations and realizations need not coincide. In particular, I estimate that eliminating
uncertainty entirely  but keeping the credit constraints in place, 13% of high school graduates
would instead choose to be college graduates and 16% of college graduates would regret their choice
under uncertainty and pick high school instead. Aggregate college attendance is almost unchanged
at 47.7% from 48.9% under uncertainty.
This paper contributes to the literature on schooling choice by explicitly looking at the role played by
uncertainty as a determinant of schooling. The idea is closely related to the work of Carneiro, Hansen, and
Heckman (2003) and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) in which a similar methodology is applied to
extract agent's information at the schooling date. While Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) assume
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no credit markets operate3 and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) assume an economy with perfect
credit markets; I investigate an intermediate economy in which some credit markets operate and borrowing
constraints arise in equilibrium.4 This allows for a more general setting in which consumption is not equal
to income every period nor is it necessary to assume that complete markets operate.
My work also contributes to the literature by modeling credit constraints as endogenous equilibrium
phenomena. As opposed to Cameron and Taber (2004) who assume that constraints arise because of an
exogenously imposed diﬀerential on the interest rate at which people borrow for consumption and that at
which they borrow for education. Like Keane and Wolpin (2001), I assume that people face a constraint
on the amount of money they can borrow. In my analysis, credit constraints arise in equilibrium as a
consequence of repayment restrictions and uncertainty about individuals future income whereas in Keane
and Wolpin (2001) the constraint is modeled as an exogenously speciﬁed function of human capital and
age.
I focus on schooling, consumption and asset holdings. Keane and Wolpin (2001) also consider labor
supply, marriage, residency with parents and the like. My simpler model is more easily interpretable
and lets me focus on assumptions about the information structure and identiﬁcation, topics they do not
consider.5 Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) (among others) assume that
shocks to outcomes are unobservable to the econometrician and uncertain to the agent. In my analysis,
I infer the amount of uncertainty facing the agent from individual choices. I prove that the model in
this paper is semiparametrically identiﬁed thus contributing to the growing literature on identiﬁcation of
dynamic discrete choice models.6
Finally, I also contribute to the literature on consumption inequality and partial insurance. By ex-
tending the insight developed by Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cunha, Heckman, and
Navarro (2005) and applying it to my model, I can identify what constitutes uncertainty at any stage in
the life cycle.7 A similar idea lies behind the test of the permanent income hypothesis in Flavin (1981).
She picks a particular assumed ARMA (p, q) time series process for income and tests whether transitory
income predicts consumption. Blundell and Preston (1998) and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2004)
use the same idea to test for partial insurance. As they acknowledge, their estimate of partial insurance
combines the eﬀects of information known to the agent but unknown to the econometrician and insurance.
The methodology proposed in this paper can, in principle, distinguish between these two explanations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a general version of the model of
consumption allocation and schooling decisions that I use in the rest of the paper. The methodology used
to infer the elements of the agent's information set is explained in section 3. In passing, I brieﬂy sketch
how semiparametric identiﬁcation of the model is achieved. Appendix 1 presents a formal identiﬁcation
analysis. Section 4 describes the data that I use, my analysis of what is in the agent's information set and
3 They also assume utility is logarithmic so their assumed coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion equals 1.
4 See Laitner (1992), Aiyagari (1994) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
5 They do allow for variability to be diﬀerent from uncertainty by allowing for unobserved types. This however, does not
evolve over time. Conditional on the unobserved type which is given at the beginning of time, variability=uncertainty.
6 See Taber (2000), Magnac and Thesmar (2002) and Heckman and Navarro (2007).
7 Pistaferri (2001) uses a similar idea by looking at expected wages as measured through a survey and measured wages in
a consumption analysis.
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the empirical results from estimating the model using the right information are presented next. Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Decision Process
Let Yi,s,t denote individual i
′s income in schooling level s at time t, Ai,s,t denote the assets he saves for
the next period, u (Ci,s,t) denote individual utility if the agent consumes Ci,s,t, u˜ (Ai,s,T ) denote the utility
in the terminal period when an individual reaches the last period with asset level Ai,s,T , and ρ be the
discount rate. Let Ii,t be the information8 available to the agent at time t, which is assumed to include
all the past and current realizations of earnings as well as the (assumed constant) interest rate r and the
asset stock. It may also contain some information about future earnings. Exactly how much is what I
estimate in this paper.
Individuals live for T + 1 periods and maximize expected lifetime utility in a world in which all risks
arise from labor market risk and are idiosyncratic. At period t = 0, for each ﬁxed schooling level s
(h=high school, c=college) and given the (expected) income sequence associated with each schooling s,
agents select an optimal intertemporal consumption allocation rule. Agents can save and borrow as much
as they want, subject to repayment constraints, via a single riskless asset A that pays a return r. Agents
then make the schooling choice that maximizes expected utility.
More precisely, the agent's problem at period t > 0 given schooling level s is to select how much of
his available resources to consume and how much to transfer to the next period. The value function given
information set Ii,t is
Vi,s,t (Ii,t) = maxAi,s,tu (Ci,s,t) +
1
1 + ρ
E (Vi,s,t+1 (Ii,t+1) | Ii,t) (1)
s.t. Ci,s,t = Yi,s,t +Wi,s,t + (1 + r)Ai,s,t−1 −Ai,s,t, Ai,s,0 = 0, Ai,s,T ≥ 0. (2)
If the utility function satisﬁes standard conditions (i.e., concavity and limC→0u′ (C) =∞), the restriction
that the agent cannot die in debt (Ai,s,T ≥ 0) imposes a borrowing constraint on the individual at every
period. In this case, the minimum value that assets can take at any period t (i.e., the maximum amount
the agent can borrow) is
AMINi,s,t =
AMINi,s,t+1 − YMINi,s,t+1
1 + r
, (3)
where YMINi,s,t is the minimum certain value that income can take at time t and Wi,s,t = max{YMINi,s,t+1 −
Yi,s,t, 0}.
From the agent's perspective (i.e., given his information at time t) the solution to the consumption
allocation problem in equation (1) consists of a pair of time-schooling indexed functions: a policy function
8 By information I mean the minimum sigma algebra generated by the random variables in Ii,t. Since I associate the
information set with a particular group of random variables Ii,t I use these concepts interchangeably.
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that tells him how much to consume this period
C∗i,s,t = Cs,t (Ii,t) (4)
and the value function associated with it
V ∗i,s,t = Vs,t (Ii,t) (5)
that gives the utility of consuming C∗i,s,t this period and then following his optimal rule for τ > t.
Once the agent solves the consumption allocation problem and gets the value associated with each s
at time t = 1
(
V ∗i,s,1
)
he uses it to select a schooling level. At period t = 0 the agent selects the schooling
level s that maximizes his expected utility net of psychic costs. He will attend college if
E (Vc,1 (Ii,1)− Vh,1 (Ii,1)− Costi | Ii,0) > 0. (6)
2.2 Speciﬁcation of the Model
Earnings for individual i at time t at schooling level s are written as9
lnYi,s,t = µs,t (Xi,s,t) + Ui,s,t (7)
where Xi,s,t represents variables that the econometrician observes and Ui,s,t variables he cannot observe.
I assume that the agent knows all of the variables in X at all times and that Ui,s,t is revealed to him
at period t. He may also know all or part of each (Ui,s,τ , τ = t+ 1, ..., T ) at time t. Uncertainty is thus
associated with {Ui,s,τ}Tτ=t+1. Ui,s,t may also include measurement error in earnings. If this is the case,
any estimate of uncertainty will be an upper bound since a fraction of the variance in Ui,s,t will be due to
the measurement error.
I write psychic costs in the schooling choice equation (6) as a function of variables Z that are observed
by both the analyst and the agent. ζ represents variables not observed by the econometrician and may
be (partially) known to the agent at t = 0. That is
Costi = φ (Zi) + ζi. (8)
The utility function is of the CRRA form
u (C) =
C1−ψ
1− ψ , (9)
where ψ ≥ 0 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Since I do not model retirement explicitly I assume
9 Although not pursued in this paper, the separability assumption is not essential and can be relaxed using the analysis
of Matzkin (2003) to analyze functions of the form lnYi,s,t = µs,t (Xi,s,t, Ui,s,t).
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that in the terminal period (i.e. the period after age 65) the utility function is given by
u˜ (Ai,s,t) = b
(Ai,s,T )
1−χ
1− χ (10)
where b weights the utility in the terminal period,  represents mortality risk and I let the function have
a diﬀerent parameter of risk aversion.
Finally, I assume that consumption is measured with error:
Ĉi,t = Ci,tq (Ki,t, ξi,t) (11)
where Ci,t is true consumption, Ĉi,t is measured consumption and q () is multiplicative measurement error
function that depends on observable variables Ki,t and unobservable variables ξi,t. Measurement error
in consumption is a natural assumption in this context since consumption is measured at the household
level from where it is imputed to the individual.10 Ki,t includes variables that control for the household
structure, ξi,t is an unobserved term assumed to capture the rest.
3 Inferring the Agent's Information Set
The econometrician must know Ii,t to solve the model to develop estimating equations. Any conclusion
extracted from the model relies crucially on the assumptions made about what constitutes the uncertainty
facing the agent. It is thus important to develop a procedure to allow the analyst to separate the compo-
nents of the agent's information set from what is unknown to him. I now turn my attention to this topic,
sketching identiﬁcation of the model in the process. Appendix 1 provides formal proof of identiﬁcation.
3.1 Testing for Information Misspeciﬁcation
I cast the problem of determining agent information sets as a testing problem11. In this section I deal with
the test of whether a candidate information set is correctly speciﬁed in a general setting12. I develop a
simple test of misspeciﬁcation for a proposed information set that does not directly depend on the model
being used.
For a given proposed information set, I˜i,t, from the model developed above it follows that ln Cˆi,s,t =
ln Cs,t
(
I˜i,t
)
+ ln q (Ki,t, ξi,t) . That is, measured consumption equals the one predicted by the model via
the policy function Cs,t plus measurement error. Notice, however, that this holds true for a whole class of
models besides the model proposed. For a nonparametric function g () of the proposed information set it
is true that
ln Cˆi,s,t = g
(
I˜i,t
)
+ ln q (Ki,t, ξi,t) . (12)
The prediction that consumption will be a function of the state variables of the model (i.e. the information
10 Imputation is done by dividing total consumption over the square root of the total number of members in the household.
11 See Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro, 2005 where a version of this test for a perfect credit markets model of schooling
choice is proposed.
12 The particular implementation of the test used in this paper is shown in section 3.3.
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set) is independent, for example, of the particular form of the utility function or of the earnings equations13.
It is in this sense that we can work with a nonparametric function of I˜i,t with the beneﬁt that the solution
of the dynamic program does not need to be computed and that the test will still be valid for a class of
models predicting that consumption can be written as in (12).
The test is simple: we want to estimate the model (either solving the dynamic problem for Cs,t in (4)
or using a nonparametric function - polynomials on the elements of I˜i,t for example) using a candidate
information set I˜i,t. Equation (12) forms part of the contribution of individual i who selects schooling
level s to the sample likelihood. Let piτ,t be an auxiliary parameter. To deﬁne the proposed test, instead
of basing the likelihood on equation (12) use
ln Ĉi,s,t = gs,t
(
I˜i,t
)
+ lnq (Ki,t, ξi,t) +
T∑
τ=t+1
[
Ys,τ − E
(
Ys,τ |I˜i,t
)]
piτ,t.
By assumption, the predicted consumption gs,t
(
I˜i,t
)
will not depend on the earnings innovations in the
last term since the agent integrates them out. The actual consumption decision, however, will be a function
of the true agent's information set at t which may contain elements of
∑T
τ=t+1
[
Ys,τ − E
(
Ys,τ |I˜i,t
)]
piτ,t.
A test of which of the auxiliary parameters multiplying the earnings innovations {piτ,t}Tτ=t+1 equals
zero is then a test of whether the proposed agent's information set at time t is correctly speciﬁed.14 Notice
that, as done in Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro, 2005, the schooling choice (or any other choice) may also
be used when testing.
Given the many ways one can propose information sets I˜i,t, especially the elements of the set unob-
served to the econometrician, the test may seem as a formidable proposition. The next sections present
assumptions to make the test operational. The main intuition, that under a correct speciﬁcation of the
information set the information innovations should not predict current choices, remains regardless of the
implementation.
3.2 The Factor Structure and the Arrival of Information
In order to separate unobserved (to the econometrician) variability from the uncertainty facing agents, it
is useful to assume that the unobservables for agent i can be factor analyzed in the following way:
Ui,s,t = θiαs,t + εi,s,t
ζi = θiλ+ ωi
(13)
where θi is a vector of mean zero mutually independent factors, εi,s,t and ωi are also mean zero random
variables called uniquenesses. Uniquenesses, factors and measurement error for consumption, ξi,t, are
all assumed mutually independent of each other for all schooling levels s and time periods t.
The equations in (13) are only a statistical decomposition and, by themselves, are not informative
13 The idea that we do not necessarily need to solve the whole dynamic program to estimate some functions is not new.
See Hotz and Miller (1993), Park (2004) and Carranza (2007) for recent examples.
14 And it can in fact be considered as a form of Sims' test of causality (Sims (1972)).
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about what is known to the agent at period t. I interpret elements of θi as permanent shocks that hit and
inﬂuence earnings at diﬀerent points in time. They provide a useful device for extracting components of
uncertainty from future outcomes.
Assume that the factor structure is such that earnings in the ﬁrst τ1 periods are aﬀected only by the
ﬁrst element of θi (so the loadings αs,t,l for l > 1 and t > τ1 would all be zero). The next τ2 periods of
earnings are aﬀected by the ﬁrst two elements of θi, the next τ3 periods by the ﬁrst three and so on. These
elements of θi would then be revealed to the agent through their eﬀect on earnings. However, the agent
might be able to forecast elements of θi that aﬀect future earnings but do not aﬀect past and currently
observed outcomes. Let θi (t) denote those elements of θi that aﬀect earnings at or before t and let θi (t)
denote those elements of θi that aﬀect earnings after t. Break θi (t) into two components,
(
θ¯ki (t) , θ¯
u
i (t)
)
where θ¯ki (t) is known by the agent so it is in Ii,t and θ¯ui (t) is unknown by the agent so it is not in Ii,t.
The following assumptions are made about the arrival of information
(I-1) The information revelation process of the agent is such that he either knows element l of θi − θi,l
(l = 1, . . . L) − or he does not. Revelation of information when it happens, is instantaneous.
(I-2) At period t, the agent observes his outcomes for the period and so he knows {εi,s,τ}tτ=1 and
the elements of θi (t), that is those elements of θi that aﬀect outcomes in that period (or in any previous
periods). If θi,l aﬀects outcomes at τ ≤ t, then it is known by the agent at time t.
(I-3) Agents have rational expectations so that the expectations they take and the mathematical
expectation operator with respect to the actual distributions in the model coincide.
The rest of the information structure of the model is assumed to be such that the agent has knowledge
of the parameters of the model (e.g., ρ, ψ, µ (X) , φ (Z)) as well as of the observables15 Xi, XMi ,Ki, Zi and
the uniqueness in the cost function ωi. The econometrician never observes θi. By assumption, {εi,s,τ}Tτ=t+1
is not part of the agent's information set Ii,t.
3.3 Determining the Information Set Under the Factor Structure
In this section I cast the problem of determining agent information sets of section (3.1) in terms of the
factor structure. Using the assumptions just made,16 I redeﬁne the test of section (3.1) to test whether a
candidate information set (i.e. a speciﬁcation of θ¯ki (t) and θ¯
u
i (t)) is correctly speciﬁed.
The test proposed in section (3.1) consists of including the income innovations relative to a proposed
information set I˜i,t and test whether they aﬀect current choices. Given the factor structure and information
assumptions (I-1) - (I-3), the only source of earnings innovations knowable to the agent is given by
θ¯i (t) (i.e. the factors that aﬀect earnings only in periods after t). Armed with this intuition it is possible
then to design a simple version of the test.
Start by assuming that the agents do not know the diﬀerent elements of θi until they learn them when
they hit earnings. That is, the model is estimated using a candidate information set I˜i,t that contains no
elements of θi (t) before time t. To deﬁne the proposed test, instead of basing the likelihood on equation
15 This assumption can be relaxed by modeling the stochastic process that generates these variables. For example, Keane
and Wolpin (1997) have one X, experience in each sector, the accumulation of which they model.
16 The assumption that θ is independent of X,Z is also imposed.
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(12) use
ln Ĉi,s,t = gs,t
(
I˜i,t
)
+ lnq (Ki,t, ξi,t) + θi (t)pit.
By assumption, the predicted consumption gs,t
(
I˜i,t
)
will not depend on θi (t) since the agent integrates
them out. The actual consumption decision, however, will be a function of the true agent's information
set at t which may contain elements of θi (t). In this case, the diﬀerent elements of ¯θi (t)
A test of whether those elements of pit associated with coordinate l of θi (t) equal zero is then a test of
whether element l of θi (t) belongs in the agent's information set at time t. That is, if the lth element of
θi (t) is actually part of the agent's information set it will aﬀect the consumption decision and the elements
of pit associated with it will be estimated to be diﬀerent from zero. Notice that, since we assumed that
the agent's do not know θi (t) at t, the ﬁrst time element l appears is the moment in which it becomes
known to the agent. For example, if factor 3 aﬀects earnings at time 5 for the ﬁrst time but it shows that
it aﬀects consumption decisions at time 2 (i.e. its associated pi2 is estimated to be diﬀerent from zero) we
conclude that the agent knows factor 3 at time 2 even though it does not aﬀect earnings until 3 periods
later.
There is nothing special about the consumption decision. Any other decision variable that depends on
future outcomes can also be used. The basic idea is that if element l of θi (t) belongs in the information set
of the agent at time t and the agent acts on it, it will aﬀect the choices he makes at t. In particular it will
aﬀect the consumption decision and we can test for it. The same idea can be applied to agent schooling
choices. Since the individual college decision is described by E (Vc,1 (Ii,1)− Vh,1 (Ii,1)− Costi | Ii,0) > 0,
estimating the model under I˜i,0 (with no elements of θi (0) contained in it) and using17
E
(
Vc,1
(
I˜i,1
)
− Vh,1
(
I˜i,1
)
− Costi | I˜i,0
)
+ θi (0)pi0 > 0
as the schooling choice rule allows us to test for pi0 = 0 as a test for misspeciﬁcation.
3.4 Identiﬁcation of the model
Formal semiparametric identiﬁcation analysis of the factor model of equations (1) - (13) is established
in Appendix 1. This section provides an intuitive sketch of the identiﬁcation arguments used in the
Appendix for the factor structure of earnings, as well as a discussion of the standard arguments under
which preferences and measurement error in consumption are identiﬁed18.
In this paper identiﬁcation theory is used to understand what in principle can be recovered nonpara-
metrically. I then use ﬂexible parametric forms to obtain estimates of my high dimensional econometric
model. The question of identiﬁability is a separate issue and should be judged independently of the choice
of parametric forms for estimation purposes19.
Earnings are identiﬁed by adapting a version of the argument in Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman
17 Notice that, same as before, we can use a nonparametric function of I˜i,1 instead of the actual solution to the dynamic
problem.
18 Identiﬁcation of the parameters of the psychic cost function is established in appendix 1. See also Heckman and
Navarro (2007).
19 See Roehrig (1988), Heckman (2005) for more on this distinction
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(2003) which I now sketch for the case in which θi is a scalar. I assume that the problem of selection (i.e.,
we only observe college earnings for college graduates and high school earnings for high school graduates)
is solved using the arguments in Appendix 1 which involve using variation in the Zi to achieve limit
sets. Without loss of generality, take the system of log-earnings equations for high school lnYi,h,t =
µh,t (Xi,h,t) + θiαh,t + εi,h,t, t ≥ 1.
First, notice that the factor θi has no natural scale, i.e., θiα=κθi
α
κ for any constant κ, so it needs to
be set by a normalization as does the sign of the factor loading. Normalizing one loading takes care of
both problems. Suppose that we normalize the loading in the ﬁrst period so that αh,1 = 1.
Assuming that X is independent of the error terms {Ui,h,t}Tt=1 form the covariance matrix of high
school log-earnings from the data. Solving the system of equations that comes from equating the data
(left hand side) to the theoretical covariance predicted by the factor structure we obtain the factor loadings
on the ﬁrst factor from
cov
(
lnYi,h,t, lnYi,h,t′ | X
)
cov
(
lnYi,h,1, lnYi,h,t′ | X
) = αh,tαh,t′σ2θ
αh,t′σ
2
θ
= αh,t, t 6= t′.
Given the loadings for all time periods, we can then recover the variance of the factor from the equations
σ2θ =
cov (lnYi,h,1, lnYi,h,t | X)
αh,t
, t = 1, ...T.
The variances of the uniquenesses for all t are recovered from var (lnYi,h,t | X)−α2h,tσ2θ = σ2εh,t , where we
know the left hand side from the data and the preceding argument. If both θi and {εi,h,t}Tt=1 are normally
distributed their distributions are identiﬁed by recovering their variances and the assumption that their
means are zero. Normality is not required to identify the distributions. Using Theorem 5 in Appendix
1, the distributions of both θi and {εi,h,t}Tt=1 can be nonparametrically identiﬁed. Notice that, while we
can form covariances for high school earnings over time, we can never form covariances of earnings across
schooling levels since earnings are not observed on both schooling levels for anyone.
Given the normalizations we just made to the high school system of earnings, making a similar set of
normalizations to the college system would amount to setting the sign (and magnitude) of the unobserved
covariance of earnings between college and high school earnings. To see this, notice that the unobserved
covariance of earnings in high school and college in period 1 is
cov (lnYi,h,1, lnYi,c,1 | X) = αc,1σ2θ (14)
so setting αc,1 = 1 would impose a strong restriction that the covariance is positive and ﬁxed by the
variance determined in the high school system. Theorem 5 in the Appendix shows that restrictions of
this nature do not need to be imposed. The system for college earnings is identiﬁed without additional
normalizations if the distribution of θi is nonsymmetric.
If θi has a symmetric distribution suppose that, beside the data on earnings, consumption and schooling
choices required for the rest of the model, a system of measurements that are not schooling dependent is
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available:
Mi,j = µMj
(
XMi,j
)
+ θiαMj + ε
M
i,j , j = 1, ...J, (15)
where εMi =
(
εMi,1, .., ε
M
i,J
)
is a vector of mean zero mutually independent random variables. εMi is assumed
to be independent of θi and of εi,s,t and ωi for all t and s.
The measurement system provides an alternative way to identify the factor loadings and uniquenesses
for college earnings without imposing further restrictions. To see why, notice that the loadings on the
measurement system are identiﬁed from
αMj =
cov
(
lnYi,h,1,Mi,j | X,XM
)
σ2θ
, j = 1, ..., J.
Take the covariance of college earnings with respect to a measurement equation: cov
(
lnYi,c,t,Mi,j | X,XM
)
=
αc,tα
M
j σ
2
θ . Then, the loadings on the ﬁrst factor for the college system are identiﬁed. By repeatedly ap-
plying Theorem 5 the distributions of
{
εMi,j
}J
j=1
and {εi,c,t}Tt=1 can also be nonparametrically identiﬁed.
The argument can be extended to the multifactor case using the results in Appendix 1.
The risk aversion parameters, the discount factors and the measurement error in consumption are
identiﬁed using relatively standard Euler equation arguments.20 Since the arguments are well known,
what follows is a simple sketch of how this is done assuming that we can write the measurement error in
consumption as q (Ki,t, ξi,t) = eKi,tδ+ξi,t and Ki,t,Ki,t+1 are contained in Ii,t.
Using the ﬁrst order condition of equation (5) and using equations (9) and (11) it follows that
E
1 + r
1 + ρ
(
Ĉi,t+1q (Ki,t, ξi,t)
Ĉi,tq (Ki,t+1, ξi,t+1)
)−ψ
− 1 | Ii,t
 = 0. (16)
which is a standard consumption Euler equation except that it contains measurement error and so the
standard argument of Hansen and Singleton (1983) cannot be applied directly. Instead, as noted by21
Chioda (2004) one can take diﬀerences of two adjacent Euler equations to form a valid moment condition
and identify ψ. With ψ in hand rewrite equation (16) as
1 + r
1 + ρ
(
Ĉi,t+1q (Ki,t, ξi,t)
Ĉi,tq (Ki,t+1, ξi,t+1)
)−ψ
= ηi,t + 1
where ηi,t is expectational error which is a function (among other things) of the elements of θi not contained
in Ii,t. Taking logs and a linear approximation of ηi,t + 1 around ηi,t = 0 we obtain
ln
Cˆi,t+1
Cˆi,t
=
1
ψ
ln
(
1 + r
1 + ρ
)
+ (Ki,t+1 −Ki,t) δ +
(
ξi,t+1 − ξi,t − ηi,t
ψ
)
(17)
From the fact that the interest rate r is given it follows that we can identify the discount factor ρ and the
20 See Hansen and Singleton (1983), Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Attanasio and Low (2004).
21 See also Ventura (1994) for the parametric case.
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observable eﬀect of measurement error δ.
We next proceed to look at the Euler equation in the terminal period
−
(
Cˆi,T q (Ki,T , ξi,T )
−1
)−ψ
+
B
1 + ρ
A−χi,T = 0 (18)
where B = bE (−χ|Ii,T ) and there is no expectation around AT since it is known at time T . For
identiﬁcation purposes it is helpful to rewrite equation (18) as
ln Cˆi,T = − 1
ψ
ln
(
B
1 + ρ
)
+
χ
ψ
ln (Ai,T )−Ki,T δ − ξi,T . (19)
Since ψ, and ρ are known from the argument above, B is identiﬁed and so is χ and the distribution of
ξi,T .
Once identiﬁcation of the risk aversion parameters ψ, χ and the discount factor ρ is secured, all
the elements required to solve the consumption allocation problem of equation (1) are in place. To
show that the distribution of the unobserved part of measurement error is identiﬁed remember that
the assumption that ξi,t is independent of θi and of Ki,t is imposed. Then, since the left hand side of
ln Ĉi,t − Ki,tδ = ln Ct (Ii,t) + ξi,t is known and so is the distribution of ln Ct (Ii,t) we can recover the
distribution of ξi,t by deconvolution.
4 Empirical Results
The model in this paper is estimated on a sample of white males who either graduated high school (and only
high school) or are college graduates. Since no single dataset contains all the information required by my
analysis, the sample used contains individuals from both the NLSY79 and PSID datasets pooled together.
This requires a separate analysis of its own where the information not available in one dataset is integrated
out against the appropriate distribution. In principle, this may invalidate identiﬁcation theorems that
assume access to all the required information. As shown in Appendix 2, where the procedure used to pool
datasets is described, this is not the case and the missing information can be integrated out in a relatively
straightforward fashion.
Table 1 presents a summary of the pooled dataset used to estimate the model.22 The sample consists
of a total of 2,986 white males born between 1923 and 1975, 1,097 from NLSY79 and 1,889 from PSID. In
general, college graduates have higher present value of earnings, consumption and assets than high school
graduates. They also have higher test scores, come from better family backgrounds, have fewer siblings
and are more likely to live in a location where college tuition is lower and to have grown up in an urban
area.
As a system of external measurements on ability I use ﬁve components from the ASVAB battery of
tests. ASVAB tests are only available for the NLSY79 sample so the assumption that their distribution is
the same in the PSID sample is imposed when integrating them out.23 Each test is modeled as a function
22 A complete description of the dataset is presented in Appendix 3 where it is shown that, in general, both datasets are
roughly comparable in the years in which they overlap both in terms of earnings and of the covariates used in the analysis.
23 See also Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004) for an analysis of ASVAB tests and their relation to ability.
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Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
PV of Earnings 18-65* 5859 330.86 334.83 0.01 6327.05 2948 253.44 170.04 0.01 4897.43 2911 409.27 429.16 0.36 6327.05
South at age 14 17916 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 9150 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 8766 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Urban at age 14 17916 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 9150 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 8766 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00
Mother's Education 17916 4.20 1.59 1.00 9.00 9150 3.76 1.39 1.00 9.00 8766 4.66 1.67 1.00 9.00
Year of Birth 17916 52.49 11.18 23.00 75.00 9150 53.13 11.26 23.00 75.00 8766 51.82 11.06 23.00 67.00
PSID 17916 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 9150 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 8766 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00
Schooling 17916 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 9150 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8766 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Siblings 17916 3.05 2.17 0.00 18.00 9150 3.37 2.31 0.00 18.00 8766 2.71 1.96 0.00 15.00
Local Tuition at age 18* 17916 1.78 0.70 0.00 5.55 9150 1.83 0.73 0.00 5.55 8766 1.73 0.67 0.15 5.31
Local Tuition at age 19* 17916 1.78 0.68 0.00 5.67 9150 1.83 0.71 0.00 5.41 8766 1.73 0.65 0.16 5.67
Local Tuition at age 20* 17916 1.78 0.66 0.00 6.47 9150 1.82 0.69 0.00 5.41 8766 1.75 0.63 0.28 6.47
Local Tuition at age 21* 17916 1.80 0.67 0.00 6.66 9150 1.84 0.71 0.00 5.57 8766 1.76 0.64 0.27 6.66
Local Unemp at age 17: High 
School
17916 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.54 9150 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.54 8766 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.30
Local Wage at age 17: High 
School
17916 8.38 6.51 0.04 20.08 9150 9.04 6.34 0.04 20.08 8766 7.69 6.62 0.04 17.40
Local Unemp at age 17: College
17916 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.35 9150 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.35 8766 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.33
Local Wage at age 17: College
17916 12.51 9.73 0.07 28.15 9150 13.43 9.41 0.07 28.15 8766 11.55 9.96 0.08 26.99
ASVAB:
 Arithmetic Reasoning 6372 0.03 0.98 -2.63 1.31 3396 -0.46 0.92 -2.63 1.31 2976 0.58 0.72 -2.04 1.31
 Paragraph Composition 6372 0.02 0.97 -4.08 1.09 3396 -0.43 1.04 -4.08 1.09 2976 0.52 0.54 -1.73 1.09
 Word Knowledge 6372 0.03 0.98 -3.79 1.16 3396 -0.42 1.07 -3.79 1.16 2976 0.54 0.52 -1.81 1.16
 Math Knowledge 6372 0.00 0.98 -3.05 2.65 3396 -0.35 0.93 -3.05 1.82 2976 0.40 0.86 -2.14 2.65
 Coding Speed 6372 0.03 0.99 -2.47 1.43 3396 -0.59 0.78 -2.47 1.43 2976 0.73 0.68 -1.85 1.43
Grade Completed: 1980 6444 11.36 1.76 7.00 17.00 3414 10.95 1.29 7.00 12.00 3030 11.82 2.07 8.00 17.00
Enrolled: 1980 6444 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 3414 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 3030 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00
Age: 1980 6582 19.18 2.17 16.00 23.00 3534 19.21 2.16 16.00 23.00 3048 19.13 2.19 16.00 23.00
Consumption* 1561 316.31 232.36 3.15 2215.00 783 251.04 142.86 3.15 1806.92 778 382.00 281.51 6.10 2215.00
Married 10302 0.70 0.42 0.00 1.00 5188 0.70 0.41 0.00 1.00 5114 0.69 0.42 0.00 1.00
Number of Children 10094 0.96 1.13 0.00 9.57 5101 1.01 1.15 0.00 8.00 4993 0.91 1.10 0.00 9.57
Age of Youngest Child 10033 2.92 4.00 0.00 20.00 5072 3.09 4.04 0.00 20.00 4961 2.74 3.95 0.00 19.67
Assets* 5113 117.06 347.73 0.00 9428.48 2596 68.07 150.06 0.00 3058.04 2517 167.58 466.29 0.00 9428.48
* Thousands of Dollars
Full Sample
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of white male high school and college graduates from NLSY79 and PSID 
High School College
Variable Name
of only the ﬁrst factor
Mi,j = β0,j +XMi β
M + θi,1αMj + ε
M
i,j ,
where, to pin down the scale of θi,1, the loading on the ﬁrst test equation
(
αM1
)
is normalized to 1. This
normalization associates higher levels of factor 1 with higher test scores, purged of the eﬀect of family
background and individual characteristics at test date, so I interpret θi,1 as ability. In this interpretation,
tests are assumed to be noisy proxies for ability which is given by θi,1.
I assume that unemployed people have earnings of zero. Earnings for individuals who are missing
are imputed only in the years in which there was no survey using an average of the earnings in the
years immediately adjacent (i.e. the year before and the year after) to the missing year. If earnings are
not available in either of these years they are left as missing. Missings are treated as random events.24
Individual earnings life cycles are then simpliﬁed to six 8 year long periods.25 This simplifying assumption
24 See Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moﬃtt (1998) for evidence that observed people in PSID have similar characteristics as
those in the CPS so attrition is roughly random. See MaCurdy, Mroz, and Gritz (1998) for evidence that attrition is random
in the NLSY79.
25 Period 1 covers ages 18 to 25, period 2 ages 26 to 33, period 3 ages 34 to 41, period 4 ages 42 to 49, period 5 ages 50 to
57 and period 6 ages 58 to 65. There is an additional terminal period in the model which includes whatever happens after
age 65. Utility in this terminal period is modeled as depending only on assets carried to that period so no additional data
for the period is required.
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is used to keep the computational complexity of the model manageable26. For each period, logearnings
are calculated as the log of the present value of earnings for the period discounted at 3%.
For each schooling level s = {h, c} and for each period of earnings t = {1, ..., 6} I ﬁnd that modeling
lnYi,s,t as being generated by a three factor model:
lnYi,s,t = Xiβs,t + θi,1αs,t,1 + θi,2αs,t,2 + θi,3αs,t,3 + εi,s,t.
is enough to ﬁt the data (see tests in section 4.1). To pin down the scale of θi,2 its loading for the second
period of high school earnings (αh,2,2) is normalized to one. Similarly for θi,3 its loading for the fourth
period of high school earnings (αh,4,3) is normalized to 1. To keep with the triangular restrictions needed
to identify the factor structure I impose that the second factor hits earnings for the ﬁrst time in the second
period (so αs,1,2 = 0 for s = {h, c}) and that the third factor hits earnings for the ﬁrst time in period 4
(so αs,t,3 = 0 for s = {h, c}, t < 4).
Variable Name Earnings Consumption Test System Cost Function
Period Dummies Yes Yes No No
Married No Yes No No
Number of Children No Yes No No
Age of Youngest Child No Yes No No
South at age 14 No No Yes Yes
Urban at age 14 No No Yes Yes
Mother's Education No No Yes Yes
Year of Birth No No Yes Yes
Grade Completed: 1980 No No Yes No
Enrolled: 1980 No No Yes No
Age: 1980 No No Yes No
Number of Siblings No No Yes Yes
PSID No No No Yes
Local Unemp at age 17: 
High School No No No Yes
Local Wage at age 17: 
High School No No No Yes
Local Unemp at age 17: 
College No No No Yes
Local Wage at age 17: 
College No No No Yes
Table 2
List of Covariates
The cost function is also allowed to (in principle, since only factors in the agent's information set at
the schooling decision age aﬀect it) be a function of all three factors:
Costi = Ziγ + θi,1λ1 + θi,2λ2 + θi,3λ3 + ωi.
The Zi include variables that only aﬀect the schooling decision like family background, local wages, local
unemployment, etc. Table 2 shows the full set of covariates used for tests, logearnings, consumption and
costs.
Each of the factors θi,l is allowed to follow a mixture of normals distribution θi,l ∼
∑Jl
j=1 pil,jf
(
θi,l;µl,j , σ2l,j
)
where f
(
x;µ, σ2
)
is a normal density with mean µ and variance σ2. The uniquenesses εi,s,t as well as the
measurement error in consumption ξi,s,t are also allowed to be distributed as mixtures of normals.
27 In
26 Estimation of the model requires the solution of the dynamic programming problem every time a diﬀerent parameter
vector is tried. Furthermore, the evaluation of the likelihood itself requires calculating a multidimensional integral for each
individual in the sample.
27 Models with normal distributions were tested and failed to ﬁt the data as well as the mixture case.
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all cases mixtures with 2 elements are found to be adequate. The remaining distributions in the model
are assumed to be normal.
The borrowing constraint is imposed so that it matches the lower limit of the assets distribution in
the data every period. That is, in any given period AMINi,s,t in equation (3) is set equal to the lowest level
of assets observed in the period. This automatically deﬁnes the YMINi,s,t term in the same equation.
Estimation of the model is done by maximum likelihood using a combination of simulated annealing,
the Nelder-Meade simplex method and the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno variable metric algorithm
to maximize the likelihood. The contribution of individual i who chooses schooling Si = s
∫
Θ
 ∏5t=1 fεi,s,t (lnYi,s,t − µs,t (Xi,s,t)− θiαs,t|θi, Xi,s,t) fεMi,j (lnMi,j − µMj (XMi,j)− θiαMj |θi, XMi,j)∏4
t=1 fξi,t
(
ln Ĉi,t − ln Cs,t (Ii,t)−Ki,tpi|θi, Xi,s,t, Zi,Ki,t
)
Pr (Si = s|Xi,s,t, Zi, θi)
 dF (θ) .
Evaluation of the likelihood requires that the econometrician solve the dynamic program (for a given
proposed Ii,t) in order to evaluate the schooling selection probability and the consumption policy function
Cs,t. Since the econometrician never observes any element of θi, he has to integrate against its distribution
when evaluating the likelihood. In the model I estimate, the solution to the consumption allocation
problem is approximated numerically using a piecewise linear approximant.
Schooling 
Choice
Age 18 - 25 Age 26 - 33 Age 34 - 41
!1 1.73 - - -
Std. Error 0.18 - - -
!2 -0.20 0.21 - -
Std. Error 0.10 0.10 - -
!3 -0.51 -0.14 -7.40 -1.13
Std. Error 0.64 0.52 3.69 1.52
Consumption
Let g(I) be the predicted choice as a function of the information set I. The left out 
factors are added to the chocie function (after the agent integrates them out) and 
test whether their associated parameters are different from zero.
Table 3
Test for Information Set Misspecification
Additional 
Parameters
4.1 Test of Misspeciﬁcation
Table 3 presents the results of the proposed test of misspeciﬁcation of the agent's information set using the
auxiliary parameters, pi, deﬁned in section 3.3 for the elements of θ¯i (t). In terms of the empirical model
described above, this entails testing whether θi,3 aﬀects the agent's choices before period 4 (when it hits
earnings), θi,2 before period 2 and whether θi,1 aﬀects schooling. As shown in the table, the hypothesis
that the pi associated with θi,3 in the schooling equation is zero cannot be rejected at a 95% conﬁdence,
but we can reject it for the pi associated with θi,1 and θi,2. That is, the test results imply that θi,3 is
not known at the time schooling decisions are made but θi,1 and θi,2 are known and so belong in the
information set of the agent. The next column presents the test for the ﬁrst period consumption decision.
What we ﬁnd is that θi,2 belongs in the information set, supporting our ﬁnding from the previous line but
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that θi,3 is not known in period 1. The third column shows that we reject the hypothesis that θi,3 is not
known at period 2.
In short, the results of the test show that both θi,1 and θi,2 aﬀect schooling choices so θi,2 is known
before it hits earnings at period 2. They also show that θi,3 becomes known in period 2 (before it hits
earnings in period 4). As a consequence, all of the results presented in the next sections are based on
estimates of the structural model using this information set. Tables A-2 to A-7 in the appendix present
the parameter estimates for this model. In total the model has 163 parameters.
4.2 Model Fit to the Data
To validate the model estimates obtained under the information set chosen as a consequence of the test
in the previous section a variety of checks of ﬁt of predictions of the model versus their data counterparts
are performed. First, the proportion of people who attend college in the data and the one predicted by
the model are compared. Whereas 48.93% of the people in the sample are college graduates, the model
predicts roughly 48.97% slightly above the actual number. When formal tests are performed, the null
hypothesis of equality of predicted and actual proportions cannot be rejected.
Figures 1.1 through 1.6 present each period's distribution of logearnings in the data and the one
predicted by the model for the overall sample. The model ﬁts the data remarkably well not only for the
overall sample but for the distributions conditional on choice too.28
T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2
Age 18-25 0.3392 0.2274 0.4369 0.1366 0.8072 0.7355 0.0066 0.1369
Age 25-33 0.1065 0.0775 0.0009 <0.0001 0.0680 0.0001 0.6597 0.1814
Age 34-41 0.7862 0.3370 0.1189 <0.0001 0.1023 <0.0001 0.0559 0.0507
Age 42-49 0.0522 0.0210 0.3326 0.2280 0.1644 0.1592 <0.0001 0.0108
Age 50-57 0.3697 0.0526 0.0001 0.0593 0.0546 0.0908 0.8034 0.7413
Age 58-65 0.1466 0.0709 0.4401 0.4215 0.0815 0.0005 0.0918 0.1575
P-values
Logearnings
Logconsumption
High School College Overall
Table 4
!
2 goodness of fit test of equality between fitted and actual distributions
*Equiprobable bins with aprox. 6 to 8 people per bin. P-values>0.05: cannot reject equality of distributions at 95% 
confidence. T1 uses data probabilities as denominator. T2 uses predicted probabilities as denominator.
Formal tests of equality of the data and ﬁtted distributions are shown in the ﬁrst six columns of table
4 for both when the χ2 statistic is formed dividing over the probability in the data and when it is formed
dividing over the predicted probability. For sixteen (or thirteen depending on the statistic used) out of
the eighteen distributions analyzed the null hypothesis of equality cannot be rejected. Even in those cases
in which equality is rejected, the predicted and actual distributions are actually very similar.
I also look at the ﬁt of consumption in the data versus consumption predicted by the model.29 Formal
tests of equality are shown in the last two columns of table 4. As before, the ﬁt is good. In 4 (or 5
28 Fit graphs for the the high school and college samples are available at
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~snavarro/reconsidering_graphs.htm.
29 Fit graphs for consumption are available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~snavarro/reconsidering_graphs.htm.
17
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
logearnings
de
ns
ity
Fitted
Actual
The plots are smoothed using a Gaussian kernel.
function of observed earnings. The graph plots the density function f generated from the data (dashed line) against that predicted by the model (solid line).
college respectively. Let S=0 denote choice of high school and choice of college. Define observed earnings as Y=SY1+(1−S)Y0. Let f(log(y)) denote the density
Log of present value of earnings from age 26 to 33 using an interest rate of 3%. Let (Y0,Y1) denote potential earnings in high school and
Figure 1.2
                Densities of fitted and actual log present value of earnings for period 2 for overall sample
The plots are smoothed using a Gaussian kernel.
function of observed earnings. The graph plots the density function f generated from the data (dashed line) against that predicted by the model (solid line).
college respectively. Let S=0 denote choice of high school and choice of college. Define observed earnings as Y=SY1+(1−S)Y0. Let f(log(y)) denote the density
Log of present value of earnings from age 42 to 49 using an interest rate of 3%. Let (Y0,Y1) denote potential earnings in high school and
Figure 1.4
                Densities of fitted and actual log present value of earnings for period 4 for overall sample
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The plots are smoothed using a Gaussian kernel.
function of observed earnings. The graph plots the density function f generated from the data (dashed line) against that predicted by the model (solid line).
college respectively. Let S=0 denote choice of high school and choice of college. Define observed earnings as Y=SY1+(1−S)Y0. Let f(log(y)) denote the density
Log of present value of earnings from age 58 to 65 using an interest rate of 3%. Let (Y0,Y1) denote potential earnings in high school and
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                Densities of fitted and actual log present value of earnings for period 6 for overall sample
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Figure 1.1
                Densities of fitted and actual log present value of earnings for period 1 for overall sample
The plots are smoothed using a Gaussian kernel.
function of observed earnings. The graph plots the density function f generated from the data (dashed line) against that predicted by the model (solid line).
college respectively. Let S=0 denote choice of high school and choice of college. Define observed earnings as Y=SY1+(1−S)Y0. Let f(log(y)) denote the density
Log of present value of earnings from age 18 to 25 using an interest rate of 3%. Let (Y0,Y1) denote potential earnings in high school and
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Figure 1.3
                Densities of fitted and actual log present value of earnings for period 3 for overall sample
The plots are smoothed using a Gaussian kernel.
function of observed earnings. The graph plots the density function f generated from the data (dashed line) against that predicted by the model (solid line).
college respectively. Let S=0 denote choice of high school and choice of college. Define observed earnings as Y=SY1+(1−S)Y0. Let f(log(y)) denote the density
Log of present value of earnings from age 34 to 41 using an interest rate of 3%. Let (Y0,Y1) denote potential earnings in high school and
The plots are smoothed using a Gaussian kernel.
function of observed earnings. The graph plots the density function f generated from the data (dashed line) against that predicted by the model (solid line).
college respectively. Let S=0 denote choice of high school and choice of college. Define observed earnings as Y=SY1+(1−S)Y0. Let f(log(y)) denote the density
Log of present value of earnings from age 50 to 57 using an interest rate of 3%. Let (Y0,Y1) denote potential earnings in high school and
Figure 1.5
                Densities of fitted and actual log present value of earnings for period 5 for overall sample
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depending on the form of the statistic one looks at) out of the 6 periods the null hypothesis of equality
cannot be rejected.
Finally, in ﬁgure 2 I present evidence of the importance of allowing for the possibility of nonnormality
on the factors. By comparing each factor with their normal equivalent, that is with a normal random
variable with mean zero and variance equal to the estimated variance of the factor, it is clear that θi,1 and
θi,3 are both highly nonnormal. Allowing for nonnormality is required to ﬁt the data. This constitutes an
extension to standard factor models which are based on normality assumptions.
4.3 Counterfactual Analysis, Variability and Uncertainty
 The plots are smoothed using a Gaussian kernel.
for the period. The graph plots the density function f(y1|choice=high school) (solid line) against f(y1|choice=college) (dashed line).
Log of present value of college earnings from age 18 to 65 using an interest rate of 3%. Let Y1 denote the present value of college  earnings
Figure 3.2
Densities of present value of college earnings conditional on schooling choice
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(dashed line). The plots are smoothed using a Gaussian kernel.
school earnings for the period. The graph plots the density function f(y0|choice=high school) (solid line) against f(y0|choice=college) 
Log of present value of high school earnings from age 18  to 65 using an interest rate of 3%. Let Y0 denote the present value of high
0
Figure 3.1
Densities of present value of high school earnings conditional on schooling choice
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Figures 3.1 and 3.2 compare ﬁtted and counterfactual distributions of earnings for each schooling level.
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The ﬁgures show that people who actually graduate college would make more money than high school
graduates in either sector. The diﬀerence, however, is much larger in the college sector so we conclude
that comparative advantage is at work. That is, even though college graduates would make more money
than high school graduates in either schooling level, they make comparatively more in the college sector
so they tend to go to college. This, however, is not the whole story. In ﬁgure 3.3 I plot the percentage
increase in lifetime earnings (i.e., the ex-post realized gain) implied by the previous ﬁgures. Two features
are worth noting, 1) a large proportion of high school graduates would have obtained positive gains if
they had gone to college; and 2) a considerable fraction of college graduates get an ex-post negative gain.
If people based their decisions only on monetary gains, and observed gains were the appropriate number
to look at when explaining schooling decisions, one would be hard pressed to ﬁnd an explanation to the
signiﬁcant proportion of people who attend college who actually obtain a negative ex-post monetary gain.
A major advantage of writing a general model of schooling decision under uncertainty is that it allows me
to distinguish between expected (by the agent) and observed (by the econometrician) outcomes.
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In order to get an idea of the diﬀerence between variability and uncertainty ﬁgures 4.1 and 4.2 present
the distributions of present value of earnings under diﬀerent assumed information sets for the agent at
the time the schooling decision is made. Even though there is a lot of dispersion, not all of it is truly
uncertain to the agent. The variability in college earnings is reduced to a much greater extent than the
variability in high school earnings as we go from a state in which the agent knows no factor to one in which
he knows θi,1 and θi,2  the correctly speciﬁed information set. Figure 4.3 shows that gains to college are
also predictable.
This pattern is more explicitly analyzed in table 5.1. In particular, as shown in the table, under the
estimated information set at time 0 (i.e. including θi,1 and θi,2) roughly 43% of what would otherwise
be considered uncertainty in high school earnings is predictable by the agent at the time his schooling
decision is made. In the same manner, the variance of the gains to college when the information set
contains θi,1 and θi,2 is only 20% of the one we would obtain if we assumed the unobservables for the
agent and the analyst coincide. That is, of the total observed variability in the present value of college
earnings only 20% constitutes uncertainty for the individual, 57% for monetary gains.
Var(YH) Var(YC) Var(YC-YH)
349205 402710 459648
Variance 346736 285190 372504
Fraction of the variance** with 
I=! explained by I1
0.71% 29.18% 18.96%
Variance 193100 76074 260178
Fraction of the variance with I=! 
explained by I2
44.70% 81.11% 43.40%
Variance 187993 71090 258965
Fraction of the variance with I=! 
explained by I3
46.17% 82.35% 43.66%
(1-0.007)*349205=325916
I1="1
I2={"1,"2}
I3={"1,"2,"3}
**The variance of the unpredictable component of high school earnings with I1="1 is
*Variance of the unpredictable component of earnings from age 18-65 as predicted at age 18.
Variance with I=!
Table 5.1
Agent's forecast* of the variance of the present value of earnings
Under different information sets at schooling choice date
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Establishing this diﬀerence is clearly important for interpretation of the results. For example, if
one were to assume that the agent's unobservables and the analyst's unobservables coincide, one would
conclude that college is a riskier state since the variance in the present value of college earnings is much
higher than the variance of high school earnings. However, when the correctly speciﬁed information set is
used instead, the variance of the uncertainty in present value of college earnings facing the agent is much
lower than the variance for high school.
High School College
Choose HS: 52.3% Choose Col: 47.7%
High School
Choose HS: 51.1%
College
Choose Col: 48.9%
Proportion of people who, after observing their realized
outcomes (keeping credit constraints in place), regret 
their choice
Table 5.2
87.02% 12.98%
16.03% 83.97%
Choice under Uncertainty
Choice under Certainty
In order to study the importance of uncertainty for schooling decisions I perform the following exper-
iment. In tables 5.2 and 5.3 I eliminate uncertainty. That is, I let people base their decisions on realized
earnings instead of on expectations, keeping the credit constraints in eﬀect. I keep the constraints at the
same level in order to get a picture of the importance of uncertainty alone even though the interpretation
of the model implies that credit constraints arise as a consequence of uncertainty. Section 4.6 relaxes
both.
High School College High School College
Ex-post Gain
1
2.15% 9.70% 0.48% 11.85%
Equivalent Variation
2
-8.60% 15.20% -9.95% 18.57%
1
Let Y1 be the present value of earnings in college and Y0 in high school. The lifetime ex-post gain is defined as 
G=(Y1-Y0)/Y0. The annual ex-post gain is simply G/4.
2
The lifetime equivalent variation is defined as the proportion by which consumption (in each period) in high 
school needs to be changed so that the individual is indifferent between choosing high school and college. The 
annual equivalent variation is the lifetime equivalent variation divided by 4.
Table 5.3
Average Annual Ex-post Gains and Equivalent Variations with 
and without Uncertainty (keeping credit constraints in place)
Choice under CertaintyChoice under Uncertainty
Table 5.2 shows the importance of looking at micro evidence when accounting for uncertainty in
schooling decisions. If we look only at aggregate numbers the simulation shows a very small eﬀect of
eliminating uncertainty (keeping credit constraints in place) on college graduation. Allowing individuals
to choose schooling using their realized outcomes instead of expectations decreases college graduation by
only 1.2% from 48.9% to 47.7%. However, when we look at the micro evidence it becomes evident that the
eﬀect is much larger. Roughly 13% of the individuals who choose to stop at high school under uncertainty
would choose to graduate college and roughly 16% of college graduates would regret their choice under
uncertainty and would have stopped at high school. Notice that this matches exactly the patterns of
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ﬁgure 3.3: a proportion of high school graduates would have earned positive ex-post gains had they gone
to college and a fraction of college graduates get negative ex-post gains and so may regret their decision.
As one would expect, sorting in terms of both ex-post gains increases. As shown in table 5.3, whereas
the average ex-post gain to college for a college graduate who makes his decision using his expectations
about future outcomes (i.e., integrating out the unknown θi,3, {εi,h,t, εi,c,t}6t=1) is 9.70% it would increase
to 11.85% if he were allowed to choose based on actual realized earnings. The same experiment shows
that the average ex-post gains for high school graduates would decrease from 2.15% to 0.48%.
4.4 Sorting on Ability
f(θ1|choice=college). The plots are smoothed using a Gaussian kernel.
choosing high school, that is, f(θ1|choice=high school). The dashed line plots the density of the factor conditional on choosing college, that is,
Let f(θ1) denote the density function of factor θ1. f(θ1) is allowed to be a mixture of normals. The solid line plots the density of the factor conditional on
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Density of ability (factor 1) conditional on schooling choice
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f(θ2|choice=college). The plots are smoothed using a Gaussian kernel.
choosing high school, that is, f(θ2|choice=high school). The dashed line plots the density of the factor conditional on choosing college, that is,
Let f(θ2) denote the density function of factor θ2. f(θ2) is allowed to be a mixture of normals. The solid line plots the density of the factor conditional on
Figure 5.2
Density of factor 2 conditional on schooling choice
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2 graph the densities of the factors 1 and 2 conditioning on schooling choice. Since θi,3
is not known by the agent at the time the schooling decision is made, there is no selection based on it
so the distribution does not change by schooling. There is strong evidence of selection in terms of ability
(factor 1). The distribution of ability for college graduates is to the right of that for high school graduates.
Individuals strongly sort in terms of ability even after controlling for family background and individual
characteristics at test date. People with higher ability graduate college more than people with lower
ability. The same holds true for factor 2. Since factor 2 is not tied to an external set of measurements
it does not have a direct interpretation. However, since it is the factor that explains earnings the most,
one could think of it as earnings ability. In other words, even after controlling for ability as measured by
factor 1, college graduates tend to earn more money than high school graduates.
Table 6 shows further evidence of the importance of sorting in terms of ability. When the average
realized gain to college by deciles of the ability (θi,1) distribution is compared for people who choose
college and people who choose high school the diﬀerences are minor. After conditioning on ability, college
graduates obtain similar gains as high school graduates although uniformly larger. However, while almost
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Mean gain
1
Proportion
2
Mean gain
1
Proportion
2
1 -5.1% 18.5% -3.9% 1.1%
2 -1.9% 16.7% -1.5% 3.0%
3 1.1% 14.3% 1.6% 5.5%
4 3.2% 12.0% 4.5% 7.9%
5 5.0% 10.4% 6.4% 9.6%
6 6.1% 8.2% 7.9% 11.9%
7 7.6% 6.8% 9.3% 13.3%
8 8.6% 5.9% 11.4% 14.3%
9 10.6% 4.6% 13.1% 15.6%
10 13.4% 2.4% 16.8% 17.9%
1
 Let YC denote lifetime earnings in college and YH denote lifetime earnings
in high school. The gain to college is [(YC-YH)/YH]/4
2 
Proportion of people who choose the schooling level indicated above and come from the 
ability decile to the left out of those who make the indicated choice. For example, 18.5% 
of those individuals who choose high school come from the first decile of the ability 
distribution.
Table 6
Annual gains to college by deciles of the ability distribution
Choose high school Choose college
Ability decile
61% of high school graduates come from the ﬁrst four deciles of the ability distribution, only 16% of college
graduates do. What accounts for the diﬀerence in ﬁgure 3.3 between high school and college graduates
is in big part the diﬀerent composition in terms of ability of the selected population which arise as a
consequence of ability and its eﬀects on preferences.
4.5 The Importance of Preferences
From the evidence presented so far, one thing should be clear: high school graduates and college graduates
are not the same. There is a great deal of heterogeneity among people. Finding high returns to college for
people who actually attend college (what is commonly called treatment on the treated in the evaluation
literature) is not necessarily informative about how much people who choose not to attend college would
make if they were to attend college.
Furthermore, not all of this variability is uncertain to the agent at the time he is making his decisions.
He can actually forecast a considerable proportion of it. Even though this goes a long way to explain why
individuals go to college, we are still facing the question of why some people would not take advantage of
the 2.15% average gain they would get if they attended college.30
So far the fact that individual decisions are based on utility maximization and not on income com-
parisons has been ignored. The estimated risk aversion coeﬃcient in the model is 0.81 (and 3.35 for the
terminal period), within the numbers reported by Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999), so agents are
in fact risk averse and do not care only about monetary returns.
A number that better summarizes the gain that individuals obtain from their schooling decisions, the
equivalent variation, is presented in the second line of table 5.3. This number is calculated by solving
for the fraction by which high school consumption needs to be multiplied every period for an individual
to be indiﬀerent between choosing high school or college. The fraction by which consumption needs to
be changed is what I call the equivalent variation. The equivalent variation is the consumption value
that an individual places on his schooling decision accounting for preferences and, depending on the case,
30 Some people would argue we would also face the question of the large return to college for college graduates of 9.7%.
Notice that this number roughly matches the number obtained from instrumental variables estimates. See Card (2001).
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uncertainty. As shown in the table, high school graduates would need their consumption to be reduced by
8.6% every period for them to be indiﬀerent. That is, even though high school graduates on average face
a positive ex-post gain of going to college, once we account for the eﬀect of preferences and uncertainty
this is no longer the case. In the same manner, the seemingly large 9.7% ex-post gain college graduates
obtain on average is increased to a 15.2% once preferences are accounted for.
f(D|choice=high school)) and the dashed line shows the density of D for agents who choose college (f(D|choice=college).
 The plots are smoothed using a Gaussian kernel.
expectation is taken with respect to the information available at period 0. The solid line shows the density of D for agents who choose high school (i.e.
Let Vh,1 and Vc,1 denote the value functions for high school and college at period 1. Define the ex−ante gross utility difference, D=E(Vc,1−Vh,1|I0) where the
Figure 6.1
Density of expected gross utility differences conditional on choice
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f(C|choice=college). The plots are smoothed using a Gaussian kernel.
high school, that is, f(C|choice=high school). The dashed line plots the density of costs conditional on choosing college, that is,
The solid line plots the density of the costs conditional on choosing Let C denote the individual psychic costs associated with attending college.
Figure 6.2
Density of psychic costs conditional on schooling choice
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In ﬁgure 6.1 the the value function diﬀerences as perceived by the agent at the time the schooling
decision is made is plotted. It is immediately apparent that, even though people who choose to go to college
have a higher gross utility return to college than high school graduates, this is not enough to account
for diﬀerences in college attendance. That is, we still ﬁnd people who choose college with negative gross
diﬀerences and people who choose high school with positive diﬀerences.
As shown in ﬁgure 6.2, the remaining part is captured by the diﬀerence in preferences for schooling
(the psychic cost function). People with low psychic costs (i.e., people who have a preference for school)
are more likely to ﬁnish college. This preference is mostly driven by ability since people with higher ability
tend to have lower psychic costs, but it is also driven by the diﬀerence in earnings captured by θi,2.
4.6 Credit constraints, risk aversion and uncertainty
The ﬁnal step in our analysis of schooling decisions is to account for credit constraints. For this purpose,
I perform two diﬀerent simulations. First, I follow the literature on the eﬀect of borrowing constraints
on schooling and look at the inability of people to pay for tuition. My ﬁrst simulation consists on setting
tuition to zero for everyone. The results are shown in the second line of table 7. Making college free for
everyone eﬀectively relaxes the credit constraint since it allows people to increase their consumption by the
amount of money that they would otherwise dedicate to tuition. It also captures the eﬀect of reducing the
price of schooling so, the result of this exercise is an upper bound on the eﬀect on relaxing the constraint
via tuition. Roughly, there is an increase of 1.5% in college attendance. The result is consistent with the
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ﬁndings of Keane and Wolpin (2001), Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cunha, Heckman, and
Navarro (2006) where a similar experiment is performed and they all ﬁnd a small eﬀect.
In the second simulation, borrowing constraints are eliminated by allowing people to select using
their realized earnings. In this case, we are back to a standard permanent income model. Notice that
people are able to smooth consumption more eﬀectively under this setting. The eﬀects of eliminating
the credit constraints and uncertainty with them are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the ones obtained from
just eliminating tuition. From the third and fourth lines of table 7 we can see that college attendance
decreases slightly when only uncertainty is eliminated, but in increases to roughly 58% when consumption
smoothing is allowed. This is the case because only 5% of college graduates regret their choice while 21%
of high school graduates do. As compared to the case in which only uncertainty is eliminated, by letting
people smooth consumption by eliminating the borrowing constraints, we give them complete information
and so to higher permanent incomes and their consumption at young ages (while in college) need not
decrease as much.
Scenario Overall
Original Economy 48.93%
Zero Tuition Economy 50.48%
Certainty with Credit Constraints 47.75%
Certainty without Credit Constraints 57.40%
Percentage of people who choose 
college under different scenarios
Table 7
Although these numbers clearly point to credit constraints playing an important role, they should be
interpreted with caution. At least three of the assumptions I make contribute to these results. First, I am
assuming that when people make their schooling decision they have no assets clearly making the constraint
really important at early ages. Second, I am assuming that all risks are idiosyncratic. If some risks were
aggregate (or in general not all risks were insurable) clearly, people would not be able to perfectly smooth
consumption and the result would be less dramatic. The tuition subsidy example shows that this is the
case by relaxing credit constraints but not completely eliminating them as would be the case of aggregate
shocks31. Finally, as opposed to the case in which credit constraints are slightly relaxed via tuition, I now
completely change the way the economy operates. General equilibrium eﬀects would certainly dampen
this response. 32Even with the caveats just mentioned, the eﬀect of credit constraints seems large enough
to play an important role. If one were to cut the eﬀect in half so that now college graduation only increases
from 48.9% to 53.17% it is still almost three times the eﬀect obtained by setting tuition to zero.
31 Tuition simulations should also be carefully interpreted since they combine relaxing the constraint with a reduction in
the price of a college education.
32 See Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998a,b, 1999) for evidence on how important this general equilibrium eﬀects can
be.
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5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the role played by ability, uncertainty, preferences and credit constraints in explaining
schooling choices. The conclusion of the paper is that there is no clear candidate for the explanation as
to why some people got to college and some don't. This may not be a surprising result given the nature
of the decision but it is by no means obvious a priori. As the results in this paper show, the college
attendance decision is composed of many parts and all of them help explain the patterns in the data.
Ability, preferences and uncertainty all play important roles. Once borrowing constraints are clearly
deﬁned and people are allowed to smooth consumption, as opposed to simply relaxing the constraint,
credit constraints play a more important role than previously found.
To the extent that simpler models are easier to interpret and require weaker assumptions they are
preferable. However, they cannot always answer the questions one maybe interested in. In very complex
models, however, the relationship between results, assumptions and data is hard visualize. In an eﬀort
to show that the results in this paper are not simply a consequence of functional forms or distributional
assumptions, I prove that the model I use is semiparametrically identiﬁed.
I build on the work Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005)
that identiﬁes the uncertainty facing the agent. I ﬁnd that agents can predict a considerable proportion of
the variance of their future earnings as well as their gains at the time schooling decisions are made. The
remaining uncertainty helps explain why some people do not go to college even though they would obtain
positive returns and why some individuals attend college when their observed ex-post return is negative.
Individuals make their decisions before all relevant information is revealed.
Ability is an important determinant of schooling choice. Individual ability helps explain college atten-
dance mostly through the individual preference for school and not through its eﬀects on earnings. That
is, once I control for ability, the return to college is very similar for college graduates and for individuals
with just a high school diploma. High ability individuals have lower psychic costs of attending college and
it is mainly through this channel that ability aﬀects college attendance.
I ﬁnd little evidence of liquidity constraints when these are deﬁned as individuals not being able to
aﬀord college. Moving to an economy with zero tuition increases college attendance by roughly 1.5%.
Since this simulation also includes the eﬀect of the reduction in the price for college this number is an
upper bound on the eﬀect of relaxing the constraint. However, when borrowing constraints are eliminated
(as well as uncertainty) the eﬀect is much larger and now college attendance increases by roughly 8%.
Once credit constraints are deﬁned in terms of consumption smoothing instead of liquidity constraints at
a point in time they play a stronger role than previously found.
Appendix 1: Semiparametric Identiﬁcation
The following assumptions are used throughout this section in order to prove semiparametric identiﬁcation
of all the elements of the model. For simplicity, delete the i subscript. Let Us = (Us,1, ..., Us,T ) , U =
(Uh, Uc) , UM =
(
UM1 , ..., U
M
j
)
, ξ = (ξ1, ..., ξT ) .
(A-1) U, UM , W and ξ have distributions that are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
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measure with support U×UM ×W× Z that may be bounded or inﬁnite. Variances are assumed to be ﬁnite.
The cumulative distribution function of W is assumed to be strictly increasing over its full support.33
(A-2)
(
X,XM ,K, Z
) ⊥⊥ (U,UM ,W, ξ) (Independence)
Semiparametric Identiﬁcation of Measurements and Logearnings with and without a Factor
Structure
Identiﬁcation of the measurement system and logearnings equations is proved in theorems 5 and 5. Only
the case in which the measurements are continuous is considered, but, as shown in Carneiro, Hansen, and
Heckman (2003), the measurements could also be discrete or mixed discrete-continuous.34
Assume that the relevant parts of (A-1) and (A-2) hold (i.e., those for UM , XM ), and that
(A-3) Support
(
µM1
(
XM
)
, ..., µMJ
(
XM
)) ⊇ Support (UM1 , ..., UMJ ).
Then, from data on F
(
M | XM) one can identify µMj (XM) over the support of XM and the joint
distribution of UM : FUM (uM ).
Proof. Identiﬁcation of the mean functions over their support is trivial since we observe Mj for
each XM and can recover the marginal distribution of UMj . The intercepts are recovered from assumed
zero mean of UMj . The joint follows immediately since Pr
(
M < m | XM) = FUM (m− µM (XM)) by
assumption (A-2). Then, from (A-3) we can ﬁnd an XM = xM where µM
(
xM
)
= k and k is a J
dimensional vector. Let m = k − µM (xM) so Pr (M < m | XM = xM) = F (k) . Since the point ω is
arbitrary, we can vary it to identify the full joint distribution. 
Assume that the relevant elements of (A-1) and (A-2) (i.e., the joint conditions on X,Z,U,W ) hold
and that the following variation free condition holds:
(A-4) Support(φ (Z) , µs (X)) = Support (φ (Z))× Support (µs (X)). (Variation free)
Let µs (X) = (µs,1 (X) , ..., µs,T (X)). Assume that Support(φ (Z)) ⊇ Support (W ) and Support (µs (X)) ⊇
Support (Us) . Then, the mean functions µs,t (X) are identiﬁed on the support of X. Also, the joint dis-
tribution of Us is nonparametrically identiﬁed for t = 1, ..., T for each s = h, c.
Proof. Under the conditions of the theorem, we can ﬁnd limit sets Z−and a Z+such that Pr (S = 1 | Z ∈ Z−) =
0 and Pr (S = 1 | Z ∈ Z+) = 1 where we can still freely change the µs (X). In the limit sets, the conditions
of Theorem 5 are satisﬁed and we can apply it for each system of schooling equations s. 
Further assume Support
(
µs (X) , µM
(
XM
)) ⊇ Support (Us, UM). Identiﬁcation of the joint distri-
bution of
(
Us, U
M
)
for each s is straightforward since, in the limit set, we can form the left hand side
of
Pr
(
M ≤ m,Ys ≤ ys | XM , X
)
= FUM ,Us
(
m− µM (XM) , ys − µs (X))
which we can trace by changing ys and m. The intercepts of µs (X) and µM
(
XM
)
are ﬁxed from the
assumption that the means (or medians) of UM , Us are zero.
When the unobservables are represented in terms of equations (13) and (15), the next theorems show
that we can nonparametrically identify the distributions of the factors and the uniquenesses as well as the
33 This assumption can easily be relaxed and is only made for convenience.
34 In all cases, with additional assumptions, we can relax additive separability and identify functions of the form y =
µ (X,U) by using the analysis in Matzkin (2003).
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factor loadings. I ﬁrst state a theorem that will be useful for this purpose.
Let Q1 and Q2 be two random variables that satisfy
Q1 = θ +R1
Q2 = θ +R2
where θ,R1and R2 are mutually independent with E (θ) < ∞, E (R1) = 0, E (R2) = 0, the conditions of
Fubini's theorem are satisﬁed for each random variable and they have nonvanishing (a.e.) characteristic
functions. Then, the marginal densities of θ,R1 and R2 are identiﬁed.
Proof. See Kotlarski (1967). 
Consider using only the information on measurements and earnings in each schooling state. For a
given schooling level s we have a system of equations
M1 = µM1
(
XM1
)
+ θαM1 + ε
M
1
...
MJ = µMJ
(
XMJ
)
+ θαMJ + ε
M
J
lnYs,1 = µs,1 (Xs,1) + θαs,1 + εs,1
...
lnYs,T = µs,T (Xs,T ) + θαs,T + εs,T
(20)
The total number of equations is given by J ·T . Let L be the total number of factors. Suﬃcient conditions
for identiﬁcation will be: L ≤ 2 · J · T + 1. That is, that the loadings are such that at least two equations
depend only on the ﬁrst factor, at least two depend only on the ﬁrst and second factor, and so on up to
the ﬁrst L − 1 factors and at least three equations depend on all L factors. Such an arrangement would
be motivated by the assumptions about the arrival of information made in the text.
If we rearrange the equations in (20) and put the factor loadings in a matrix, it would have the form
Loadings for factor
θ1 θ2 θ3 ... θL−1 θL
6= 0 0 0 ... 0 0
6= 0 0 0 ... 0 0
6= 0 6= 0 0 ... 0 0
6= 0 6= 0 0 ... 0 0
... ... ... ... ... ...
6= 0 6= 0 6= 0 ... 6= 0 0
6= 0 6= 0 6= 0 ... 6= 0 0
6= 0 6= 0 6= 0 ... 6= 0 6= 0
6= 0 6= 0 6= 0 ... 6= 0 6= 0
6= 0 6= 0 6= 0 ... 6= 0 6= 0
(21)
Now, assume that LM factors enter the measurement equations and, without loss of generality, suppose
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we look at s = h.35
From the analysis in Theorems (5) and (5) we have data on F
(
UM , Uh | X,XM
)
and assume that
UM , Uh has a factor structure representation as in (13). Then, the loadings
{
αMj
}J
j=1
, {αh,t}Tt=1 are
identiﬁed up to one normalization for each factor. The marginal distributions of {θl}Ll=1 ,
{
εMj
}J
j=1
and
{εh,t}Tt=1 are nonparametrically identiﬁed as well.
Proof. To ease on notation I generically write the equations in (20) as yk =
∑L
l=1 θlδk,l + ek. So, if for
example lnYh,t is the ﬁfth equation, y5 = lnYh,t − µh,t (X), the loading on the third factor αh,t,3 = δ5,3
and εh,t = e5.
Notice that, since the factor has no natural scale, we need to set it (that is δθ = κδ θκ for any constant
κ). We also need to normalize the sign of the eﬀect of the factor since, for example, having more of factor
l and δl,k > 0 is equivalent to having less of the factor and δl,k < 0. To pin down sign and scale, we
normalize one loading to one for each factor.
Start by taking the ﬁrst two equations and any other equation k > 2 and normalize δ1,1 = 1. Since
we know their joint distribution we can identify the loadings on factor one for the second equation by
forming
cov (yk, y2)
cov (yk, y1)
= δ2,1
and the loading for the kth equation from
cov (yk, y2)
cov (y1, y2)
= δk,1.
Since the choice of the kth equation is arbitrary we can identify all of the loadings for factor one. With
the loadings on hand, we can the take equation 1 and any equation k and form
y1 = θ1 + e1
yk
δk,1
= θ1 +
L∑
l=2
θl
δk,l
δk,1
+
ek
δk,1
.
Using Theorem 5 we can nonparametrically identify the distributions of θ1, e1 and
∑L
l=2 θl
δl,k
δ1,k
+ ekδ1,k (and
of
∑L
l=2 θlδl,k + ek).
We now take equations 3 and 4 and some arbitrary equation k > 4. Normalizing δ3,2 = 1 we can
identify the loadings on factor 2 on the remaining equations by forming
cov (yk − θ1δk,1, y4 − θ1δ4,1)
cov (y3 − θ1δ3,1, y4 − θ1δ4,1) = δk,2
35 As before, if we are willing to make an additional normalization, we can identify the factor structure without the additive
separability assumption using equations of the form y = µ (X, θ′α+ ε) following the analysis in Heckman, Matzkin, Navarro,
and Urzua (2004).
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and take equations 3 and k
y3 − θ1δ3,1 = θ2 + e3
yk − θ1δk,1
δk,2
= θ2 +
L∑
l=3
θl
δk,l
δk,2
+
ek
δk,2
.
Apply theorem 5 and identify the distributions of θ2,e3 and
∑L
l=3 θl
δk,l
δk,2
+ ekδk,2 nonparametrically. By
proceeding sequentially we can identify all of the loadings and nonparametric distributions of the model
for measurements and schooling s = h. 
From the Theorem 5, we now have knowledge of the nonparametric distribution of the factors and
uniquenesses as well as the loadings for measurements and schooling s = h.We next turn our attention to
identiﬁcation to the analogous system of equations in (20) for the college (s = c). Notice that, since the
measurement equations do not depend on the schooling level chosen, they are identiﬁed from our previous
argument and so are the distributions of the elements of θ.
Take any two equations from the college system and one of the equations that depend only on θ1.
First assume that at least one of the three equations corresponds to a measurement, say Mj . Then, from
cov
(
Mj , lnYc,t | XM , X
)
= αMj αc,tσ
2
θ1
we can identify αc,t for any t = 1, ..., T. If, on the other hand,
none of the equations is a measurement equation we can apply the next theorem that shows that if the
distribution of θ is nonsymmetric, we can identify the factor loadings even if there are no measurements.
Take a generic system of three equations with a factor structure
y1 = θ1δ1,1 + e1
y2 = θ1δ2,1 + e2
y3 = θ1δ1,3 +
L∑
l=2
θlδ3,l + e3.
with θ a vector of mean zero mutually independent factors with known distribution of and e1, e2 and e3
also mean zero independent of each other and of the factors θ. Then, if
(A-6) E
(
θk1
) 6= 0 for k an odd integer
the loadings δ1,1, δ2,1 and δ3,1 are identiﬁed and so is the nonparametric distribution of the uniquenesses
{ej}2j=1 and of
∑L
l=2 θlδ3,l + e3.
Proof. I illustrate the case in which k = 3 for condition (A-6). The extension is obvious. Form
cov (y1, y2) = δ1,1δ2,1σ2θ1
cov (y1, y3) = δ1,1δ3,1σ2θ1
cov (y2, y3) = δ2,1δ3,1σ2θ1
and solve for
δ21,1 =
cov (y1, y2) cov (y1, y3)
cov (y2, y3)σ2θ1
.
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Then from
E
(
y21yj
)
= δ21,1δ1,jE
(
θ31
)
we identify δj,1 for all j > 1. Going back to cov (y1, y2) we recover δ1,1. The distributions of the unique-
nesses follow by deconvolution.
Identiﬁcation of the whole system for s = c follows by applying the same logic of theorem 5 sequentially.

Identiﬁcation of the Cost Function
Write the college attendance condition (6) as E (Vc,1 (I1)− Vh,1 (I1)− φ (Z)− θλ− ω | I0) > 0. Let θ0
denote the elements of θ included in the agent's information set at the time the schooling decision is
made and let λ0 denote the subvector of λ associated with them. Deﬁne E
(
V∗c,1 (I1)− V∗h,1 (I1) | I0
)
=
µV (X) + τ
(
X, θ0
)
which is known since all of the elements of E
(
V∗c,1 (I1)− V∗h,1 (I1) | I0
)
are known
from our previous analysis. The econometrician has data on the left hand side of
Pr (S = c|X,Z) = Pr (τ (X, θ0)− θ0λ0 − ω > φ (Z)− µV (X)) .
Assume that the relevant elements of (A-1) hold. Change (A-2) so that the independence of Z and
the error terms holds conditional on X.
Let Ze be the elements of Z that are not a part of X (excluded) and further assume that we can deﬁne
φ (ze, x) for all pairs (ze, x) in the support of Z. As with all discrete choice problems the scale needs to
be set. Assume that
(A-7) var
(
τ
(
x˜, θ0
)− θ0λ0 − ω) = 1 for X = x˜.
Then, if φ (Z) satisﬁes the requirements is a part of the Matzkin class of functions (Matzkin (1992),
Heckman and Navarro (2007)), λ0 and the nonparametric distribution of ω are identiﬁed up to normal-
ization.
Proof. Deﬁne Υ
(
X, θ0
)
= τ
(
X, θ0
)−θ0λ0−ω and ﬁx X = x˜. The observed probability that the agent
chooses college (conditional on X = x˜ and using A-7) is Pr
(
Υ
(
x˜, θ0
)
> φ (Ze, x˜)− µV (x˜)
)
where µV (x˜)
is a known constant (conditional on X = x˜). Using the (conditional on X) independence of θ0λ0 +ω and
Ze we can then use the analysis of Matzkin (1992) to identify φ (Ze, x˜) and the distribution of Υ
(
x˜, θ0
)
,
all of this conditional on X = x˜, up to a normalization.
Next, still conditional on X = x˜, we can form the joint distribution of measurements, logearnings and
the choice index since know the left hand side
Pr
(
UM ≤ m− µM (XM) , Us ≤ ys − µs (x˜) | X = x˜, S = s, Ze = ze)Pr (S = s | Ze = ze)
=
∫ m−µM(XM)
−∞
∫ ys−µs(ex)
−∞
∫ ∞
φ(ze,ex)−µV (ex) f
(
UM , Us,Υ
(
x˜, θ0
))
dΥ
(
x˜, θ0
)
dUsdU
M
and we can trace it by varying m, y, zE . With the joint distribution in hand, form the covariance matrix
and, following the reasoning of theorems 5 and 5 identify λ0. To see how, take the covariance between the
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choice index and the ﬁrst equation (i.e., the one that only depends on θ1), say M1 :
cov
(
Υ
(
x˜, θ0
)
,M1
)
= cov
(
τ
(
x˜, θ0
)
, θ1α
M
1,1
)
+ λ01α
M
1,1σ
2
θ1
where everything but λ01 is known so we can solve for it. Proceeding recursively we identify all of the
elements of λ0.
With λ0 known, we can take Υ
(
x˜, θ0
)
and deconvolve the distribution of ω since it is independent of
X by A-2 and of θ by the factor structure assumptions. Finally, by changing the value of ze, x˜ we can
trace φ (Ze, X) coordinate by coordinate since, for any value of X, the scale var
(
τ
(
X, θ0
)− θ0λ0 − ω) is
a function of known elements. 
Appendix 2: Pooling Datasets
A serious practical empirical problem plagues most life cycle analyses. It is a rare data set that includes
the full life cycle earnings experiences of any person along with their test scores, measurements, school-
ing choices and background variables. Many data sets like the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY79) have partial information up to some age. A few other data sets (e.g., the Panel Survey on
Income Dynamics, PSID) have full information on some life cycle variables but lack the full detail of the
richer data which provide information only on truncated life cycles. As I show in this Appendix, the factor
model setup used in this paper provides a natural framework for combining samples.
To ﬁx ideas and motivate the empirical work, suppress the individual i subscripts and, following the
text, write
lnYs,t = Xtβs,t + θ1αs,t,1 + θ2αs,t,2 + εs,t t = 1, ..., 6. (22)
An individual picks S = 1 if E
(
V∗c,1 − V∗h,1 − φ (Z)− θ1λ1 − θ2λ2 − ω | I0
)
> 0, where Z may include
elements in common with X. Following the notation in Appendix 1, I rewrite this in index form as
I = µV (X) + τ (X, θ0)− φ (Z)− θ1λ1 − θ2λ2 − ω > 0.
Measured consumption is given by
ln Ĉt = ln Ct (It) +Ktpi + ξt.
Finally, the external measurements are written as
Mj = XMβM,j + θ1αM,j + εM,j , j = 1, ..., J,
where J is the number of test scores. For the case in which we have access to full life cycle data, the
contribution to the likelihood of an individual who chooses S = s, is given by
∫
Θ
6∏
t=1
1∏
s=0
{f (lnYs,t|θ,Xt)Pr (S = s|Z, θ)}1(S=s)
4∏
t=1
f
(
ln Ĉt|θ,K
) J∏
j=1
f (Mj |θ,XM ) dF (θ) .
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Identiﬁcation follows from the analysis in Appendix 1.
Now, suppose that we only have access to a sample A in which we only get to observe some of the
variables at early stages of the life cycle. In particular, assume that sample A does not include observations
on {Ys,t}6t=4 as is the case with the NLSY79.
The contribution to the likelihood of an individual who chooses, for example, S = 1 is
∫
Θ
 ∏3t=1 {f (lnYs,t|θ,Xt)}Pr (I > 0|Z, θ)∏3t=1 f (lnĈt|θ,K)∏J
j=1 f (Mj |θ,XM )
{∏6
t=4
∫
f (lnYs,t|θ,Xt) dF (lnYs,t)
}  dF (θ)
=
∫
Θ
3∏
t=1
{f (lnYs,t|θ,Xt)}Pr (I > 0|Z, θ)
3∏
t=1
f
(
ln Ĉt|θ,K
) J∏
j=1
f (Mj |θ,XM ) dF (θ) (23)
We integrate out data for the periods in which we do not observe earnings. In the same way if, for
example, consumption was not observed for this individual in period 3, we could simply integrate it out.
Notice that we can still identify the factor structure on earnings (for periods 1 through 3), the consump-
tion measurement error parameters and distributions for the periods observed, risk aversion parameter if
at least two periods of consumption observations are available and the measurement equations using the
argument on Appendix 1. The latent index and the consumption information for the periods in which
no consumption observations are available are lost since we need to identify all of the components of the
solution to the dynamic program to form the schooling decision.
Now, suppose that we have access to a second independent sample B that is generated by the same
process that generates sample A.36 In this second sample, we do not observe {Mk}Kk=1 but we do observe
earnings, consumption and schooling choices (and X and Z) for all time periods. For an individual with
S = 1 sampled from B, his contribution to the likelihood would be given by
∫
Θ
6∏
t=1
{f (lnYs,t|θ,Xt)}Pr (I > 0|Z, θ)
4∏
t=1
f
(
ln Ĉt|θ,K
) J∏
j=1
∫
f (Mj |θ,XM ) dF (Mj) dF (θ)
=
∫
Θ
6∏
t=1
{f (lnYs,t|θ,Xt)}Pr (I > 0|Z, θ)
4∏
t=1
f
(
ln Ĉt|θ,K
)
dF (θ) . (24)
From this sample alone we cannot recover the loadings or the marginal distributions of θ1, θ2, θ3,
{
{εs,t}2s=1
}6
t=1
and the cost function, without additional assumptions.37
Suppose we combine both samples (so that a person's contribution to the likelihood is given by (23)
if an individual comes from sample A and is given by (24) if he comes from sample B). In this case, we
would be able to recover all of the elements of the model. To see why, notice that from sample A alone all
36 By this I mean that the parameters and distributions of the implied random variables of both samples are the same.
37 It is clear we will never recover any of the parameters of the measurements. If we changed our normalizations on the rest
of the system however, so that now θ2 did not enter earnings at t = 1, 2 for example, we could recover all of the remaining
parameters of the model. Alternative normalizations would produce identiﬁcation, but inconsistency in the models ﬁt across
samples.
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that was left to recover in terms of earnings were the parameters and distributions for earnings in t > 3.
Now, in sample B we can form
Cov (Ys,t, Ys,1) = αs,t,1αs,1,1σ2θ1
Cov (Ys,t, Ys,2) = αs,t,1αs,2,1σ2θ1 + αs,t,2αs,2,2σ
2
θ2 , t = {4, 5, 6} ,
where all parameters except αs,t,1 and αs,t,2 are known from our analysis of sample A. It is straightforward
to show that we can solve for the unknowns αs,t,1and αs,t,2 for t > 3 and s = 0, 1. Identiﬁcation of the
parameters of the third factor follows then immediately from our analysis of Appendix 1. Since we have
identiﬁed all of the parameters of the earnings equations, we can solve for the parameters of the cost
equation by solving the dynamic program. More generally, we can obtain more eﬃcient estimates for the
over-identiﬁed parameters by pooling samples.
This procedure abstracts from cohort eﬀects on the coeﬃcients and factor loadings, and cohort eﬀects
on the distributions of θ. With additional structure (e.g., additivity), I can identify such eﬀects, but I
acknowledge that general cohort eﬀects can dramatically bias estimates based on pooling the data.
Appendix 3: Data
I use data on white males from NLSY79 and pool it with data for white males that are household heads
from PSID. In the original NLSY79 sample there are 2439 white males. Out of this, 1334 have either
a high school degree (and high school only) or a college degree. I then try to recover earnings for as
many individuals as possible. First, individual earnings are formed by taking total income from wages
and salary in the past calendar year directly from the NLSY deﬂated to year 2000 prices using the
Consumer Price Index reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Then, because the NLSY survey was
not administered in 1995, 1997 and 1999 so earnings for any individual in these years are not observed I
impute earnings in these years by taking the average of the earnings in the immediately adjacent years
if available. Unemployed individuals have zero earnings on those years and are ﬂagged as having missing
earnings otherwise.
The PSID sample is a little more problematic since attrition is much more common in that survey
than in the NLSY79.38 Many of the characteristics required for my analysis, in particular for the analysis
of test scores, are not available. The PSID, however, allows me to analyze people of all ages something
that cannot be done with the NLSY79.39 Earnings in the PSID sample are obtained by using the annual
labor earnings variable. As with NLSY79, I impute earnings for the years in which there was no survey
using an average of the two immediately adjacent years if possible.
The individual life (ages 18 to 65) is then simpliﬁed into 7 periods: t = 0 (schooling choice decision,
right before 18), t = 1 (18-25), t = 2 (26-33), t = 3 (34-41), t = 4 (42-49), t = 5 (50-57) and t = 6 (58-65)
where earnings for each period are deﬁned as the present value of earnings for the ages included in the
38 But see Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moﬃtt (1998) for evidence that observed people in PSID have similar characteristics
as those in the CPS so attrition is roughly random.
39 NLSY79 interviews people born between 1957 and 1964 so it is only possible to follow all cohorts up to age 40 and the
older cohort up to age 47.
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Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
South at age 14 0.22 0.42 0.25 0.44
Urban at age 14 0.75 0.44 0.88 0.33
Mother's Education 4.43 1.45 4.57 1.59
Year of Birth 60.82 2.17 60.02 2.21
Schooling 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.50
Number of Siblings 2.82 1.84 2.92 1.86
Local Tuition at age 18* 2.09 0.80 2.02 0.56
Local Tuition at age 19* 2.04 0.75 1.95 0.59
Local Tuition at age 20* 1.99 0.70 1.82 0.56
Local Tuition at age 21* 2.01 0.71 1.84 0.61
Local Unemp at age 17: 
High School 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.02
Local Wage at age 17: 
High School 13.65 1.50 12.90 1.18
Local Unemp at age 17: 
College 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
Local Wage at age 17: 
College 20.46 2.29 19.07 1.75
Married 0.40 0.44 0.80 0.34
Number of Children 0.53 0.95 1.01 0.98
Age of Youngest Child 0.87 2.10 1.54 1.92
* Thousands of Dollars
Table A-1
NLSY79 and PSID for people born between 1957 and 1964
NLSY79 PSID
Variable Name
period discounted using an interest rate of 3%. If the present value of earnings cannot be formed then the
individual is ﬂagged as having missing present value of earnings for the period.
The procedure to get consumption data in both samples is fairly similar in principle. Household
consumption at time period t is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between available resources -household income
plus assets available at the beginning of the period- minus the discounted assets available the next period.
40 In order to recover more consumption observations, if assets are not observed at the beginning of the
period as required I use assets either one year before or after it (discounted appropriately). Imputing
household consumption for the PSID sample is slightly more problematic since questions about wealth
were only asked in 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2001 but it is done in the same way as with NLSY79.
To impute individual consumption I divide household consumption by the square root of the number of
members in the household. I try to correct for the measurement error introduced by this procedure in the
estimation as explained in the text.
Tuition between 1972 and 2000 is deﬁned as the average in state tuition in colleges in the county of
residence. If there is no college in the county then average tuition in the state is taken instead. For years
prior to 1972, national tuition trends are used to project county tuition backwards keeping the average
observed structure of the period 1972-1977. That is, a regression of the diﬀerence between national tuition
and county tuition between 1972 and 1977 against county dummies is run. The predicted value is the
average diﬀerence between national and county tuition which can then be added to the national tuition
observed in the years previous to 1972.
To perform a quick check of whether the NLSY79 and PSID background variables are comparable,
40 See Browning and Leth-Petersen (2003) for evidence that, at least for the case of Denmark where very detailed data on
consumption is available, this procedure works well.
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table A-1 shows the means in both datasets for the 1957-1964 cohort.41 No signiﬁcant diﬀerences in either
means or standard deviations for the comparable cohort on both datasets can be seen with the exception
of the consumption measurement error variables. Table 1 in the text contains a summary of all variables
in the pooled data set.
NLSY speciﬁc variables
In 1980, NLSY respondents were administered a battery of ten achievement tests referred to as the Armed
Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) (See Cawley, Conneely, Heckman, and Vytlacil (1997) for
a complete description). The math and verbal components of the ASVAB can be aggregated into the
Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Test (AFQT) scores.42 Many studies have used the overall AFQT score as a
control variable, arguing that this is a measure of scholastic ability. In this paper, the interpretation that
AFQT is an imperfect proxy for scholastic ability is taken and the factor structure is used to capture this.
Potential aggregation bias is avoided by using each of the components of the ASVAB score as a separate
measure.
41 I look at these variables in particular because the questions for the PSID sample refer to the period when the individual
grew up whereas the NLSY79 variables refer to a particular age.
42 Implemented in 1950, the AFQT score is used by the U.S. Army to screen draftees.
37
Appendix 4: Parameter Estimates
Variable Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Constant -0.99 0.19 -1.00 0.19 -0.98 0.19 -1.00 0.19 -0.98 0.19
Lived in South at age 14 -0.08 0.04 -0.08 0.04 -0.08 0.04 -0.08 0.04 -0.08 0.04
Lived in Urban at age 14 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04
Mother's Education 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01
Number of Siblings -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.01
Highest grade at test date 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02
Enrolled at test date 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04
Age at test date -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.02
θ1 1.00 - 0.87 0.03 0.93 0.03 0.61 0.04 0.96 0.04
Variance 0.24 0.01 0.33 0.02 0.33 0.02 0.61 0.03 0.24 0.02
Estimated Parameters for Test Equations
Table A-2
Mathematics 
Knowledge
Arithmetic 
Reasoning
Word Knowledge
Paragraph 
Completion
Coding Speed
Variable Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Constant 9.50 0.00 9.50 0.00 9.50 0.00 9.50 0.00 9.50 0.00 9.50 0.00
Age 26-33 1.46 0.04 1.46 0.04 1.46 0.04 1.46 0.04 1.46 0.04 1.46 0.04
Age 34-41 1.78 0.03 1.78 0.03 1.78 0.03 1.78 0.03 1.78 0.03 1.78 0.03
Age 42-49 1.63 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.63 0.00
Age 50-57 1.63 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.63 0.00
Age 58-65 0.79 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.79 0.00
θ1 0.43 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.12 0.00 0.20 0.00 -0.22 0.00
θ2 0.00 - 1.00 - 1.16 0.03 1.08 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.10 0.00
θ3 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 1.00 - 1.26 0.00 0.95 0.00
Mixture Parameters:
Mean 1 0.39 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.41 0.00
Mean 2 -1.77 - -0.88 - -0.64 - -0.24 - -0.72 - -0.65 -
Variance 1 0.74 0.12 0.17 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.31 0.00
Variance 2 5.12 1.47 14.99 2.00 7.19 0.65 0.81 0.08 1.93 0.00 2.16 0.00
Mixture Weight 1 0.82 0.08 0.96 0.01 0.93 0.02 0.88 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.62 0.00
Mixture Weight 2 0.18 - 0.04 - 0.07 - 0.12 - 0.20 - 0.38 -
Age 58-65
Estimated Parameters for High School Earnings Equation
Table A-3
Age 50-57Age 18-25 Age 26-33 Age 34-41 Age 42-49
Variable Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Constant 8.64 0.00 8.64 0.00 8.64 0.00 8.64 0.00 8.64 0.00 8.64 0.00
Age 26-33 2.78 0.03 2.78 0.03 2.78 0.03 2.78 0.03 2.78 0.03 2.78 0.03
Age 34-41 3.03 0.01 3.03 0.01 3.03 0.01 3.03 0.01 3.03 0.01 3.03 0.01
Age 42-49 3.05 0.00 3.05 0.00 3.05 0.00 3.05 0.00 3.05 0.00 3.05 0.00
Age 50-57 2.85 0.00 2.85 0.00 2.85 0.00 2.85 0.00 2.85 0.00 2.85 0.00
Age 58-65 2.36 0.00 2.36 0.00 2.36 0.00 2.36 0.00 2.36 0.00 2.36 0.00
θ1 0.17 0.10 0.21 0.04 0.47 0.00 1.12 0.00 1.50 0.00 1.14 0.00
θ2 0.00 - 0.93 0.03 1.25 0.01 1.27 0.00 1.28 0.00 0.81 0.00
θ3 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.37 0.00 1.12 0.00 1.19 0.00
Mixture Parameters:
Mean 1 0.46 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.45 0.00
Mean 2 -1.46 - -0.60 - -1.11 - -0.41 - -3.22 - -1.39 -
Variance 1 0.79 0.13 0.20 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.25 0.00
Variance 2 3.30 0.71 5.72 0.50 7.40 0.02 2.13 0.00 3.73 0.00 2.36 0.00
Mixture Weight 1 0.76 0.09 0.92 0.01 0.95 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.76 0.00
Mixture Weight 2 0.24 - 0.08 - 0.05 - 0.12 - 0.06 - 0.24 -
Age 58-65
Estimated Parameters for College Earnings Equation
Table A-4
Age 50-57Age 18-25 Age 26-33 Age 34-41 Age 42-49
Variable Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Constant 0.54 0.04 0.54 0.04 0.54 0.04 0.54 0.04 0.54 0.04 0.54 0.04
Age 26-33 -0.68 0.04 -0.68 0.04 -0.68 0.04 -0.68 0.04 -0.68 0.04 -0.68 0.04
Age 34-41 -0.64 0.04 -0.64 0.04 -0.64 0.04 -0.64 0.04 -0.64 0.04 -0.64 0.04
Age 42-49 -0.52 0.04 -0.52 0.04 -0.52 0.04 -0.52 0.04 -0.52 0.04 -0.52 0.04
Age 50-57 -0.46 0.05 -0.46 0.05 -0.46 0.05 -0.46 0.05 -0.46 0.05 -0.46 0.05
Age 58-65 -0.63 0.07 -0.63 0.07 -0.63 0.07 -0.63 0.07 -0.63 0.07 -0.63 0.07
Married -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02
Number of Children -0.18 0.01 -0.18 0.01 -0.18 0.01 -0.18 0.01 -0.18 0.01 -0.18 0.01
Age of Youngest Child 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Mixture Parameters:
Mean 1 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 -
Mean 2 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 -
Variance 1 0.88 1.17 0.04 0.00 1.77 0.27 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02
Variance 2 0.31 0.11 0.86 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.79 0.45 4.31 8.10 0.46 0.19
Mixture Weight 1 0.16 0.43 0.86 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.94 0.02 0.94 0.05 0.41 0.16
Mixture Weight 2 0.84 - 0.14 - 0.94 - 0.06 - 0.06 - 0.59 -
Age 58-65
Table A-5
Estimated Parameters for Consumption Measurement Error
Age 26-33 Age 34-41 Age 42-49 Age 50-57Age 18-25
Mixture Parameters: Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Mean 1 -0.65 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.00
Mean 2 0.44 - -1.60 - -1.55 -
Variance 1 0.48 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.07 0.00
Variance 2 0.14 0.00 0.55 0.00 1.12 0.00
Mixture Weight 1 0.41 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.93 0.00
Mixture Weight 2 0.59 - 0.05 - 0.07 -
Factor 2 Factor 3Factor 1
Table A-6
Estimated Parameters for Factor Distributions Variable Estimate Std. Err.
Constant 3.09 0.55
Lived in South at age 14 0.55 0.11
Lived in Urban at age 14 -1.13 0.12
Mother's Education -1.32 0.08
Year of Birth 0.01 0.01
PSID 0.61 0.15
Number of Siblings 0.29 0.03
Local HS Unemp at age 17 6.90 1.84
Local HS Wage at age 17 0.62 0.06
Local Col Unemp at age 17 2.85 2.60
Local Col Wage at age 17 -0.30 0.04
θ1 -2.44 0.42
θ2 -0.91 0.35
Variance 1.00 -
Variable Estimate Std. Err.
Risk Aversion (ψ) 0.82 0.00
Risk Aversion Terminal (χ) 3.35 0.00
Beta Terminal (B) 4.05 0.00
Discount Factor (1/(1+ρ)) 0.58 0.00
Table A-7
Estimated Parameters for Cost Equation 
and Utility Functions
Cost
Utility
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